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The Status and Legitimacy 
of M’Naghten’s Insane Delusion Rule 
E. Lea Johnston†* and Vincent T. Leahey** 
This Article investigates jurisdictions’ compliance with M’Naghten’s 
directive for how to treat delusions in insanity cases and assesses the 
validity and reasonableness of courts’ application of the law. Most U.S. 
jurisdictions employ an insanity test roughly modeled on the rule 
articulated in the 1843 M’Naghten’s Case. This test focuses on a defendant’s 
inability to know, because of a mental disease, the nature of her act or its 
wrongfulness. But the M’Naghten judges also issued a second rule — 
particular to delusions — that has received much less attention. This rule 
holds that, when the defendant labors under a “partial delusion only,” her 
culpability must be assessed as if the factual content of her delusion were 
true. Thus, if a person with delusions killed as she believed in self-defense, 
she should be acquitted. But if she killed anticipating future harm, she would 
be convicted of intentional murder. Commentators have long dismissed the 
delusion rule as obsolete, and the last examination of states’ use of the rule 
was sixty years ago. 
This Article excavates the insane delusion rule and assesses its current 
force. Its review reveals the rule maintains its vibrancy, continues to evolve, 
and in some places is growing in influence. Nine jurisdictions — California, 
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Florida, Georgia, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and the federal 
and military systems — give special significance to delusions. These 
jurisdictions vary in their understanding of how the rule relates to general 
insanity; whether the rule functions only to establish (not defeat) insanity; 
and whether it operates as a background principle or manifests in jury 
instructions. The status of the rule is currently in flux, so understanding its 
permutations may inspire movement in the law. 
Next, the Article subjects the insane delusion rule and its current variants 
to the crucible of modern science. The justness of the rule turns on whether 
a defendant with delusions likely possessed — and could have fairly been 
expected to exercise — adequate reasoning abilities while in the throes of 
psychosis. To examine this question, the Article applies insights from the 
cognitive sciences on how delusions are formed, are maintained, and may 
affect moral decision-making. Research in psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience suggests that the cognitive biases and emotional impairments 
that contribute to the origin and maintenance of delusions impair the 
capacity for moral decision-making in delusional individuals, at least in the 
context of decisions connected to those delusions. The scientific findings 
demonstrate the inseparability of cognition, emotion, and volition and thus 
hold implications for the insane delusion rule, insanity more generally, and 
the broader legal treatment of individuals with psychosis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Robert Loredo was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia when he 
was twenty-two years old.1 At age twenty-seven, he shot and killed two 
men — one was his father.2 Having been off his antipsychotic 
medication for four months, Loredo became convinced that a Mexican 
drug cartel had infiltrated his family’s business, an auto repair shop, and 
transformed it into a drug distribution system. He believed that the 
cartel planned to kill him because he would not cooperate in 
transporting drugs and that his father was in on the scheme. He 
understood that members of the cartel were tracking his movements 
and listening to his conversations.  
Loredo’s mental illness, schizophrenia, produced a delusion that 
inspired the killings.3 How will this delusion factor into Loredo’s 
insanity defense for the murder charges? Does it matter whether the 
circumstances of the delusion, if true, would have justified the killings? 
The answer to these questions depends on the jurisdiction in which the 
crimes occurred. In some jurisdictions, whether the delusion squares 
with a legal justification will largely determine the success or failure of 
a defendant’s insanity defense.  
The possibility of differential treatment arises because of an oft-
neglected rule in M’Naghten’s Case, the 1843 English case which 
provides the prevailing standard for insanity in the United States.4 The 
 
 1 “Paranoid schizophrenia” is currently an informal diagnosis used by clinicians, 
as this subtype of schizophrenia does not appear in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  
 2 The facts in this hypothetical were inspired by those in People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 906, 909-10 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial of reh’g. 
 3 “Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting 
evidence.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 87 (5th ed. 2013). 
 4 See infra Part I. 
  
1780 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1777 
M’Naghten judges declared that “in all cases” a defendant may establish 
her insanity if she proves that, at the time of committing the act and 
because of a mental disease or defect, she either did not know the nature 
and quality of her act, or did not know what she was doing was wrong.5 
Elements of this standard persist in the insanity standards of most states 
and the federal government.6  
But the M’Naghten judges issued a second rule as well, this one 
particular to delusions. This rule (the insane delusion rule) holds that, 
when the defendant “labours under . . . [a] partial delusion only, and is 
not in other respects insane, . . . [she] must be considered in the same 
situation as to responsibility if the facts with respect to which the 
delusion exists were real.”7 Thus, if a person killed a man because she 
believed (in her delusional state) that he posed an imminent and deadly 
threat, then she would be acquitted on grounds of insanity because, had 
the facts been as she perceived, her deadly act would have been justified 
in self-defense. On the other hand, if the perceived facts suggested the 
man only posed a non-deadly or non-imminent threat, she would be 
convicted of intentional murder. Commentators have long believed the 
delusion rule to be “obsolete” and in “desuetude,”8 and the last 
examination of states’ treatment of delusions within their insanity 
standards took place more than half a century ago.9 
This Article evaluates the current status of the insane delusion rule in 
M’Naghten jurisdictions and analyzes courts’ application of the law 
 
 5 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (HL). 
 6 See infra note 38. Important topics unaddressed by this Article include possible 
rationales for the insanity defense, how these rationales fit within defensible theories of 
punishment and excuse, and how well the M’Naghten test satisfies any justification for 
the insanity defense. For a collection of critiques of M’Naghten and its right-and-wrong 
test, see HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 63-68 (1954).  
 7 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211. Scholars also call this rule the partial 
insanity rule, the partial delusion rule, the specific delusion rule, the mistake of fact 
rule, the counterfactual rule, and the delusional limb of M’Naghten. 
 8 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART §§ 145, 160 (2d ed. 
1961); see also H. Barnes, A Century of the McNaghten Rules, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 300, 305 
(1944) (arguing that the delusion test “is no longer accepted anywhere”). Others note 
the rule but are dismissive of its impact. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW § 7.2(b)(5) (3d ed. 2020). While the American Bar Foundation mentioned the rule 
in its 1971 edition of The Mentally Disabled and the Law, the most recent edition of this 
book does not address it. See AM. BAR FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 380 
(Samuel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971). State treatises on insanity law 
— in states that follow the rule — neglect the topic or sometimes omit it altogether. See 
infra notes 104, 135 and accompanying text (offering examples of treatises and 
handbooks that omit or neglect the insane delusion rule in Texas and Florida, 
respectively). 
 9 See WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 104, 108. 
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given the relationship of delusions to moral reasoning. In so doing, it 
makes two primary contributions. First, it excavates the insane delusion 
rule and assesses its current force. Notably, a comprehensive review of 
the insanity statutes and case law in United States jurisdictions reveals 
that the insane delusion rule maintains its vibrancy, continues to evolve, 
and in some places is growing in influence.10 The rule is employed in 
nine jurisdictions that, combined, account for roughly half of the 
current prison population.11 These jurisdictions vary in their 
understanding of the relationship of the delusion rule to general 
insanity, with some considering the rule a quintessential example of the 
general test,12 and others finding it applicable only when the general test 
is unavailing.13 They also differ in their operationalization of the rule, 
including whether they use the rule solely to benefit the defendant, or 
whether its use may deprive the defendant of an insanity acquittal.14 
Additionally, the rule may operate as a background legal principle or 
manifest in instructions to the jury, given at the defendant’s request or 
possibly over her objection. The status of the rule in multiple 
jurisdictions is currently in flux,15 so understanding its various 
permutations and their effects may inspire movement in the law. 
 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 252156, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 4 tbl.2, 28 tbl.18 
(2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/63NR-AD2U] 
(showing these nine jurisdictions made up approximately 47% of the prison population 
in 2017); infra Part II (discussing delusions’ significance in insanity jurisprudence in 
California, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, federal courts, and 
military courts). 
 12 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the use of the delusion rule by Tennessee, 
Oklahoma, the military, and federal justice systems). 
 13 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Georgia’s current use of the rule and Florida’s 
previous use of the rule). 
 14 See infra Part II. The information on state practices presented in this Article 
derives from appellate decisions, jury instructions, treatises, and state practice 
materials. These resources almost certainly paint an incomplete and imperfect picture 
of trial practice. Surveys of trial judges or defense attorneys, or a review of trial 
transcripts (where available), could provide a useful supplement to this material. 
 15 For example, in California, the insane delusion rule appears in nonofficial but not 
official jury instructions. Compare CAL. JURY INSTR. – CRIM. 4.06 (2020) (instructing on 
insane delusion as a defense), with JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. JURY INSTR. – CRIM. 3450 (2020), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/CALCRIM_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L9SD-AKD2]. Florida’s law on the treatment of insanity claims based on a perceived, but 
delusional, justification is muddled and in need of clarification. See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
Although Texas has long followed the insane delusion rule, one 2009 unpublished case 
found the state legislature eliminated this common law defense when it enacted a new penal 
code in 1974. See infra note 105. In addition, some of the most important decisions on insane 
delusions have been issued in the last decade. See, e.g., United States v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319 
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This Article’s second contribution is to subject the insane delusion 
rule and its current variants to the crucible of modern science. Each 
variation relies on critical assumptions about the type of disordered 
thinking that should relieve responsibility and the relationship of 
delusions to moral reasoning. The rule rejects the notion that a genuine 
mistake of fact derived from mental disorder should always excuse. 
Instead, the rule holds that delusional mistakes without justifying or 
excusing content will not excuse, presumably because of the culpability 
inherent in the defendant’s decision to act in a way (had circumstances 
been as she believed) prohibited by law. The justness of holding an 
individual to account in these circumstances turns on whether the 
delusional defendant likely possessed — and could have fairly been 
expected to exercise — adequate reasoning abilities while in the throes 
of psychosis.16 Therefore, critical to the soundness and humanity of the 
insane delusion rule is whether delusions do or may signal impairments 
destructive of sound decision-making within the context of decisions 
involving those delusions. 
Most scholars who have remarked upon the insane delusion rule over 
the last 150 years have declared it unjust, often on scientific grounds. 
They have argued that the rule ignores the reality that delusions are not 
“partial” but rather affect the whole mind,17 unreasonably expects a 
person with delusions to reason like a person without a mental 
disorder,18 and distinguishes between delusions of equivalent 
psychological composition.19 This Article supplements and deepens 
those arguments by applying insights from the cognitive sciences on 
 
(C.A.A.F. 2013) (applying an objective interpretation of “wrongful” when the defendant 
suffers from an insane delusion); People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906 (Ct. App. 2015), as 
modified on denial of reh’g (holding that, in cases involving delusional justified force, a trial 
court should provide instructions on the legal standard for self-defense to allow the jury to 
assess a defendant’s understanding of the wrongfulness of her acts); Martin v. State, 110 So. 
3d 936, 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the defendant was entitled to a self-
defense instruction due to his delusions at the time of the charged event). 
 16 Psychosis carries several possible meanings. See Michael S. Moore, The Quest for 
a Responsible Responsibility Test: Norwegian Insanity Law After Breivik, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
645, 655-57 (2015). The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders lists a number of psychotic disorders, including schizophrenia and delusional 
disorder. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 3. In addition, Michael Moore articulates a 
“more substantive” medical definition that focuses on gross impairment of reality-
testing and severe abnormalities of behavior. See Moore, supra, at 656. In this latter 
sense, observes Moore, the psychoses roughly correspond with the “non-medical, 
common sense view of madness.” Id. at 657.  
 17 See infra notes 75–77, 222. 
 18 See infra note 46. 
 19 See infra note 223. 
  
2021] M’Naghten’s Insane Delusion Rule 1783 
how delusions are formed, are maintained, and may affect moral 
decision-making.20  
These scientific literatures reveal that the series of cognitive and 
emotional impairments that contribute to the formation and 
maintenance of delusions holds significant consequences for moral 
decision-making related to those delusions.21 Research in the fields of 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience has established a framework by 
which to understand moral reasoning in healthy individuals. Separately, 
researchers in the cognitive sciences have been investigating the 
relationship of delusions to cognitive and emotional impairments 
corrosive of sound decision-making. This Article combines and assesses 
these literatures to find that the significant cognitive and emotional 
impairments associated with delusions could impair moral decision-
making, especially in the context of decisions colored by delusional 
content.22 These findings should inform usage of the insane delusion 
rule and the general right-and-wrong test more broadly. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews the origin of the 
insane delusion rule and its relationship to the general right-and-wrong 
test in M’Naghten. Part II provides a detailed exposition of jurisdictions’ 
current use of the rule. It identifies primary variations and explores how 
each works in practice. Crucially, while modern commentators find the 
affirmative aspect of the insane delusion rule unobjectionable,23 
experience suggests its use may weaken a defendant’s general insanity 
defense. 
Part III constitutes the scientific contribution of the Article. It first 
presents the leading psychological frameworks of decision-making and 
moral reasoning. It then plumbs the cognitive sciences literatures to 
detail the cognitive impairments that support delusions. Next, it 
 
 20 See infra Part III. 
 21 See, e.g., Lea Ludwig, Dirk Werner & Tania M. Lincoln, The Relevance of Cognitive 
Emotion Regulation to Psychotic Symptoms – A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 72 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 1-2, 8-13 (2019) (explaining that “difficulties in [emotion 
regulation] are closely linked to psychotic symptoms”); Thomas Ward & Philippa A. 
Garety, Fast and Slow Thinking in Distressing Delusions: A Review of the Literature and 
Implications for Targeted Therapy, 203 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 80, 80-83 (2019) 
(discussing cognitive predispositions of people who suffer from delusions, including 
the tendency to jump to conclusions); Lisong Zhang, Zhongquan Li, Xiaoyuan Wu & 
Ziyuan Zhang, Why People with More Emotion Regulation Difficulties Made a More 
Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological Inclinations, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., Nov. 
2017, at 5 (finding that “individuals with more emotional regulation difficulties” 
preferred more deontological actions). 
 22 See infra Part III.  
 23 See infra note 341. 
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analyzes dysfunctions in emotion regulation associated with psychosis, 
emotions’ contribution to the existence of delusions, and the effect of 
stress on persecutory delusions. It concludes by assessing the possible 
effect of these impairments on moral reasoning.  
Part IV uses the lessons derived from Parts II and III to propose legal 
reforms. It endorses the affirmative aspect of the insane delusion rule 
and suggests a form of the rule for possible adoption. This rule would 
permit delusional beliefs to satisfy the insanity defense in two 
circumstances: (a) when, had they been true, the beliefs would have 
provided a justification or excuse for the criminal act, and (b) when the 
mental disorder that caused the delusional beliefs (of any content) 
substantially impaired the individual’s capacity for moral reasoning. 
Finally, Part V briefly surveys the broader lessons that the science of 
delusions offers for the law of insanity and the legal treatment of 
individuals with psychosis, including rethinking the artificial 
distinction between cognition, emotion, and volition and considering 
the creation of a generic partial excuse. These topics will be explored in 
future work.24 
I. M’NAGHTEN’S INSANE DELUSION RULE 
The existence of, and ambiguities in, the insane delusion rule stem 
from two English cases in the early nineteenth century. In 1843, Daniel 
M’Naghten shot and killed Edward Drummond, private secretary to 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, believing him to be Sir Robert.25 The 
defendant allegedly suffered from the paranoid delusion that the Tories, 
which included Sir Robert, were harassing him.26 He attempted to kill 
 
 24 See E. Lea Johnston, Delusions and Moral Incapacity, 97 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 
2022) [hereinafter Delusions and Moral Incapacity] (on file with authors); E. Lea 
Johnston & Vincent T. Leahey, Delusions and Partial Responsibility (Mar. 25, 2021) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 25 For a book-length treatment of M’Naghten’s Case, see generally RICHARD MORAN, 
KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN (1981). 
Controversy surrounds the spelling of Daniel M’Naghten’s name. As Richard Moran 
recounts, M’Naghten’s surname has been spelled at least twelve different ways. Id. at xi-
xiii. This Article uses “M’Naghten,” as his name was spelled in his English legal case. 
 26 Daniel M’Naghten, in his single public statement concerning his motive, 
explained:  
[The Tories] follow, persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely destroyed 
my peace of mind. . . . I cannot sleep nor get no rest from them in consequence 
of the course they pursue towards me. . . . They have accused me of crimes of 
which I am not guilty, they do everything in their power to harass and 
persecute me; in fact, they wish to murder me.  
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Sir Robert to terminate the persecution. M’Naghten advanced a “partial 
insanity” defense at trial.27 His chief counsel argued that “any act 
committed as the result of a delusion was by definition an act of 
insanity” — a test at odds with the prevailing common law doctrine that 
irresponsibility depended upon total inability to distinguish right from 
wrong.28 The medical evidence established that M’Naghten was afflicted 
with a “morbid delusion” that “left him no such perception [of right 
and wrong] and . . . he was not capable of exercising any control over 
acts which had a connection with his delusions.”29 When the solicitor 
general chose not to contest that evidence, Chief Justice Nicholas Tindal 
stopped the trial.30 The jury found M’Naghten “Not guilty, on the 
ground of insanity.”31 
The public and the Queen were outraged by the verdict.32 In response, 
the House of Lords issued four questions to the fifteen judges of 
England in an attempt to understand “the nature and extent of the 
unsoundness of mind which would excuse the commission of a felony 
of this sort.”33 Reflecting the undisputed factual setting of M’Naghten’s 
Case, the Lords framed their questions within the context of “insane 
delusions.”34 Questions II and III concerned jury instructions.35 
Responding on behalf of fourteen judges,36 Chief Justice Tindal 
pronounced this standard for insanity, which has come to be known as 
the general test:  
[I]n all cases . . . to establish a defence on the ground of 
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the 
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know 
 
Id. at 10.  
 27 Richard Moran, The Modern Foundation for the Insanity Defense: The Cases of James 
Hadfield (1800) and Daniel McNaughtan (1843), 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
31, 38 (1985) [hereinafter The Modern Foundation]. 
 28 Id. For an illuminating yet pithy account of the historical development of the 
right and wrong test, see WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 52-59. 
 29 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 201 (HL). 
 30 Moran, The Modern Foundation, supra note 27, at 31, 38-39. 
 31 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 202. 
 32 See Moran, The Modern Foundation, supra note 27, at 31, 39-40. 
 33 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 202-03. 
 34 See id. at 203 (including “insane delusion” in Questions I, II, and IV). A fifth 
question concerned expert testimony and is not relevant to this discussion.  
 35 Id.  
 36 See id. at 208. Mr. Justice Maule delivered a separate opinion. Id. at 204. 
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the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know 
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.37 
Today, twenty-seven states, plus the federal and military systems of 
justice, use insanity standards that include at least the latter part of the 
M’Naghten test, which this Article refers to as the general right-and-
wrong test for insanity.38  
Chief Justice Tindal articulated a second rule which applies solely to 
insane delusions. To Question IV — “If a person under an insane 
delusion as to existing facts, commits an offense in consequence thereof, 
is he thereby excused?” — the Chief Justice answered:  
[T]he answer must of course depend on the nature of the 
delusion: but, . . . [assuming] that he labours under such partial 
delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he 
must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as 
if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real.39 
The judges’ answers left unclear whether the insane delusion rule 
merely provides an example of the general right-and-wrong test, or 
whether it creates a distinct test for irresponsibility that could 
supplement the general insanity standard or even detract from it.40 
Commentators’ conclusions on this point have diverged.41 The 
 
 37 Id. at 210. 
 38 As defined in this Article, jurisdictions whose wrongfulness prong is modeled on 
the M’Naghten standard declare insane a person who, because of her mental disease, did 
not — or was unable to — know or appreciate the wrongfulness of her action (as 
opposed to one who merely lacked a substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness). 
We include states that assess the ability to appreciate, not merely to know, in this 
grouping because courts generally construe these terms consistently. See generally infra 
notes 61–71 and accompanying text (discussing how “knowledge” has been interpreted 
in light of the M’Naghten test). These states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, 
and West Virginia. See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1051-55 (2020) (reciting the 
insanity test of each state). Fundamental fairness does not compel a state to offer either 
prong of the M’Naghten insanity defense, or, indeed, any affirmative defense of insanity 
at all. See id. at 1037. 
 39 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211; see also id. at 209 (providing a similar and 
consistent answer to Question I). 
 40 See WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 105, 107; Barnes, supra note 8, at 304; Dennis R. 
Klinck, “Specific Delusions” in the Insanity Defence, 25 CRIM. L.Q. 458, 464-70 (1983). 
 41 Compare WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 107-08 (“And since the judges were not 
professing to reform or modify the law, but merely to state the law of England as it then 
was, it seems that this mistake of fact test was not intended by the judges as a distinct 
test, but as entirely consistent with the right and wrong test they had just set forth.”), 
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difficulty has been that the judges’ task was merely to explain current 
law — and they professed to do nothing more42 — yet the insane 
delusion rule appeared to introduce a novelty.43 Prior to M’Naghten, no 
court or textbook had articulated an insanity rule specific to delusions, 
certainly not one that subjected the delusion to an objective standard of 
justification or excuse.44  
M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule operates in a manner similar to the 
mistake-of-fact doctrine, with delusion substituting for the 
reasonableness of the mistake.45 A chief criticism has been that the rule 
 
with ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 966 n.89 (3d ed. 1982) (“No 
doubt what the judges meant is that if a man, who is not insane within the right-wrong 
rule, has a delusion he will be treated as if the imaginary facts were real.”), and Klinck, 
supra note 40, at 466-70 (considering and rejecting the view that the insane delusion 
rule is a separate test from the general rule), and Philip Lyons, Responsibility Without 
Individual Responsibility?: The Controversy over Defining Legal Insanity, 45 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 391, 402-03 (1974) (suggesting that the answers to Questions I and IV apply when 
one’s reason is not so overcome that she cannot know the wrongfulness of her act). 
 42 See M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 208. 
 43 See HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS 23 (1909); 
DOUGLAS AIKENHEAD STROUD, MENS REA OR IMPUTABILITY UNDER THE LAW OF ENGLAND 77 
(1914) (arguing that the delusion rule had no basis in English law). 
 44 WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 107-08; Barnes, supra note 8, at 300, 305; see LAFAVE, 
supra note 8, at § 7.2(b)(5). A likely precursor to the insane delusion rule was the 
Hadfield case of 1800, where the famed barrister Thomas Erskine eloquently argued that 
insanity should extend beyond “total deprivation of memory and understanding” to 
reach actions emanating from a circumscribed delusion. Trial of James Hadfield (1800) 
27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1312-13 (KB); see also Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a 
Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield (1800), 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 487, 
499-500, 503 (1985). The jury ultimately found Hadfield not guilty by reason of 
insanity, but, because the presiding judge had not instructed the jury on a specific test 
of legal responsibility, the case held no precedential value. See id. at 508. It appears that 
the majority of judges in M’Naghten had wanted to resolve a perceived lack of clarity 
that remained after Hadfield and to reject, once and for all, the idea that a mere causal 
link between a defendant’s delusion and her criminal act sufficed for an insanity 
acquittal. See DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 173 (1996); Klinck, supra note 40, at 473, 476; Henry 
Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law of Criminal Insanity, 6 SW. L.J. 47, 62-63 (1952). 
 45 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, at 965 (“One not suffering from an insane 
delusion would not be excused for such a killing unless the mistake was a reasonable 
one under the circumstances, but the delusion will take the place of reasonable grounds 
for the belief in the mistake of fact defense.”); see OPPENHEIMER, supra note 43, at 218. 
The insane delusion rule also strongly resembles Christopher Slobogin’s “integrationist” 
alternative to an affirmative test for insanity. See infra note 323.  
It is worth noting that, in exculpating on the basis of a perceived need for defensive 
force, the rule resembles the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. That doctrine holds that, 
when the defendant killed another person under a genuine but unreasonable mistake of 
fact, the defendant acted without malice, and thus murder is reduced to manslaughter. 
See In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994); State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 
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subjects people with delusions to the standards of reasoning demanded 
of sane people.46 It is certainly the case that the insane delusion rule, in 
excusing acts stemming from delusional beliefs that align with a legal 
defense, privileges sane reasoning. However, the force of this complaint 
depends upon whether those who fail the insane delusion test may 
appeal to the general right-and-wrong insanity test. If they may, then 
disordered reasoning may still excuse, but insanity must be proven 
through lack of capacity to distinguish right from wrong, not through 
the specific content of a delusion.  
The import of the insane delusion rule — and the extent to which the 
rule is distinct from the general right-and-wrong test, is engulfed by it, 
or detracts from it — depends in part on the meaning of three terms: 
“wrong,” to “know,” and “partial delusion.”47 “In all cases” a 
defendant’s responsibility turns on her ability to know, at the time of 
the act, that what she was doing was wrong.48 The English judges in 
M’Naghten employed differing usages of the term “wrong” in their 
 
440 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. 1991). However, 
imperfect self-defense generally is not available when one is acting under delusions. See 
People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 955 (Cal. 2014) (“No state, it appears, recognizes 
‘delusional self-defense’ as a theory of manslaughter. We have noted that unreasonable 
self-defense involves a mistake of fact.” (citing In re Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580 n.3)). 
A claim of impartial self-defense based only on delusions would be a claim of insanity 
under M’Naghten. Id. at 962.  
 46 See S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 249-53 (1927); 
HENRY MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE 216 (1883) (arguing the absurdity 
of assuming a delusion “which itself exists only in violation of all reason should conform 
in its action to laws which govern the action of, and are therefore appreciable by, a 
sound intelligence”); I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 47 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1860) (“This is virtually saying to a man, ‘You are 
allowed to be insane; . . . but have a care how you manifest your insanity; there must be 
method in your madness.’”); Jau Don Ball & A. M. Kidd, The Relation of Law and 
Medicine in Mental Disease, 9 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1920); Carl Cohen, Criminal 
Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 30, 39-40 
(1959); Klinck, supra note 40, at 463; see also Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 
1887) (“If he dare fail to reason, on the supposed facts embodied in the delusion, as 
perfectly as a sane man could do on a like state of realities, he receives no mercy at the 
hands of the law.”); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 387-88 (1871) (“[The insane delusion 
rule] practically holds a man confessed to be insane, accountable for the exercise of the 
same reason, judgment, and controlling mental power, that is required of a man in 
perfect mental health.”). 
 47 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210-11. 
 48 Id. at 210. She may also be excused if, because of a mental disease, she did not 
know the nature and quality of her act. Id. In Clark v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that inability to understand the nature or quality of one’s act would necessarily be 
encompassed by the broader standard of inability to distinguish wrongfulness. 548 U.S. 
735, 753-54 (2006). 
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answers to the House of Lords49: two answers confined “wrong” to 
illegality,50 while two others defined “wrong” in reference to a moral 
wrong that is also illegal.51 Scholars have wrestled with this 
contradiction and its import for the insane delusion rule.52 A number 
have viewed the insane delusion rule as redundant with the general 
right-and-wrong test.53 In essence, a defendant cannot have known an 
act was wrong if she believed it was legally justified.54  
Many state courts define “wrong” for their jurisdiction. Currently, a 
majority of states conceptualize wrongfulness as contrary to public or 
societal standards of morality,55 but a minority limit it to illegality.56 
 
 49 The judges’ varying usage is understandable; most crimes were mala in se at the 
time M’Naghten was decided, so the distinction between legal and moral wrongfulness 
was of little salience. The authors are grateful to Michael Mannheimer for sharing this 
observation. 
 50 See M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 209 (declaring the defendant is “punishable 
according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing 
such crime that he was acting contrary to law; by which expression we understand your 
Lordships to mean the law of the land”); supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 51 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210 (“If the accused was conscious that the 
act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to 
the law of the land, he is punishable . . . .”). 
 52 See RAY, supra note 46, § 29 (reasoning that the right-and-wrong test conflicts 
with the first answer in M’Naghten because a person may believe she is doing the right 
thing by breaking the law); accord J.J. Child & G.R. Sullivan, When Does the Insanity 
Defence Apply? Some Recent Cases, 2014 CRIM. L. REV. 787, 799-800 (illustrating that a 
person may satisfy the delusion test but fail the knowledge of wrong test when she kills 
a victim, believing the victim to be a demon, but knowing that the law would condemn 
the killing); infra notes 53–55. 
 53 See LAFAVE, supra note 8; WILLIAMS, supra note 8, §§ 156, 160; Norval Morris, 
Daniel M’Naughten and the Death Penalty, 6 RES JUDICATAE 304, 323 (1953); Orvill C. 
Snyder, Who Is Wrong About the M’Naghten Rule and Who Cares?, 23 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1956); see also John S. Strahorn, Jr., Criminology and the Law of Guilt, 84 U. PA. L. 
REV. 600, 619 (1936) (noting that the insane delusion test is a “substantial expression 
of the right and wrong test”). Stanley Yeo concludes that Commonwealth nations, such 
as Canada and New Zealand, eliminated the insane delusion rule because they found 
the rule redundant under the right and wrong test. Stanley Yeo, The Insanity Defence in 
the Criminal Laws of the Commonwealth of Nations, 2008 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 253. 
 54 WILLIAMS, supra note 8, § 160. Oppenheimer agrees that the insane delusion rule 
is just a special application of the general wrongfulness rule. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 
43, at 36. In most cases, the general test would excuse those cases also excused under 
the insane delusion rule. Id. at 219. Oppenheimer argues that in some cases, the insane 
delusion rule would excuse in cases that the general rule would not. Id. But rather than 
supporting the rule, these cases show its potential absurdity. Id. at 219-20.  
 55 United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 56 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1035 & n.10 (2020) (listing sixteen states).  
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Because insanity cases typically involve serious crimes,57 public 
morality usually equates to legality.58 Societal standards of morality may 
extend beyond legality, however, especially in cases involving delusions 
of a deity commanding the act in question.59 Even when wrongfulness 
reduces to illegality, a defendant cannot establish her ignorance of the 
wrongfulness of her act by simply demonstrating her ignorance of the 
law.60 As in criminal law generally, ignorance of the law is no defense.  
The language of M’Naghten’s general insanity test makes clear that 
“knowledge” is a product of, and is dependent upon, the holder’s ability 
to reason.61 First, the opinion conditions criminal responsibility on 
sufficiency of reason.62 Second, the opinion dictates that, to qualify for 
insanity, a defendant must prove that a “disease of the mind” produced 
“such a defect of reason” that she did not “know” the act’s 
wrongfulness.63 Thus, an examination of a defendant’s reasoning 
deficits (broadly conceived) is necessary to determine if her 
ascertainment of “knowledge” was intolerably improbable to warrant an 
 
 57 ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 52 (1967); see Eric Silver, Carmen 
Cirincione & Henry J. Steadman, Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity 
Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 66-67 (1994) (finding that, in a study of 8,953 
defendants in eight states who entered an insanity plea between 1976 and 1985, 14.3% 
of defendants pleading insanity had been charged with murder, 54.1% had been charged 
with other violent offenses, and 31.6% had been charged with nonviolent offenses). 
 58 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 52. 
 59 State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1321 (N.J. 1990). 
 60 See M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (HL) 
(observing that “the law is administered upon the principle that every[]one must be 
taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it”). 
 61 See HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 198 (1972) (“The 
defect-of-reason clause tells us that ‘know the nature and quality of the act’ and ‘know 
that is wrong’ must be taken to apply with reference to the person’s reason, his capacity 
for rational conduct.”). 
 62 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210 (instructing “every man is to be presumed 
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, 
until the contrary be proved”). 
 63 See id. at 210-11. 
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excuse.64 This is ultimately a moral and legal judgment for the trier of 
fact.65 
Courts and scholars have recognized that, to guide a person’s action, 
“knowledge” of wrongfulness must extend beyond mere intellectual 
awareness.66 Although many states do not define the operative term 
 
 64 This focus on reasoning is consonant with scholars’ views that practical reasoning 
and rationality are crucial for moral and legal responsibility. See, e.g., HERBERT 
FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
218 (1979) (arguing that “capacity for rational conduct . . . has actually been at the 
center of the practical intuition that mental disability negates responsibility”); MICHAEL 
S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 245 (1985) (recognizing 
an excuse when the accused is “so irrational as to be nonresponsible”); ROBERT F. 
SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 215-16 (1991) (advocating for an insanity defense that identifies 
“substantial impairment in the defendant’s capacity for practical reasoning regarding 
the offense” as the excusing condition and “gross disturbance of cognitive processes 
such as concept formation or reasoning” as the disability); Robin Anthony Duff, Who is 
Responsible, for What, to Whom?, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 444-45 (2005) (“The 
responsible person is ‘responsible’ (i.e., capable of responding appropriately) to reasons: 
she is capable of recognizing, deliberating about and being guided (or guiding herself) 
by reasons.”); Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 294 (2003) [hereinafter Diminished Rationality] (“A reasonable 
capacity for rationality is the fundamental criterion for responsibility.”); Benjamin B. 
Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the 
Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1415 (1986) (“Irrationality is a vital aspect 
of the exculpatory nature of insanity because rationality is an essential attribute of 
intelligible conduct, of behavior an observer, such as a jury, can interpret.”). While 
these scholars generally agree that insanity involves irrationality, their theories of 
irrationality differ in important ways. See Stephen P. Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 
BUFF. L. REV. 123, 142-43 (2018). 
 65 See infra note 229. 
 66 See infra notes 67–68. A number of scholars have advocated for a broad 
conception of knowledge. See, e.g., JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (1883) (arguing that anyone “who was deprived by disease 
affecting the mind of the power of passing a rational judgment on the moral character 
of the act which he mean to do” cannot “know” its wrongfulness); Walter Bromberg & 
Hervey M. Cleckley, The Medico-Legal Dilemma: A Suggested Solution, 42 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 729, 737 (1952) (“When no longer dismembered and 
falsified in one-dimensional aspect, but considered in all that we sometimes imply by 
‘appreciation,’ ‘realization,’ ‘normal evaluation,’ ‘adequate feeling,’ ‘significant and 
appropriate experiencing,’ etc., the term ‘knowing’ does not restrict us solely to a 
discussion of the patient’s reasoning abilities in the abstract.”); Jerome Hall, Psychiatry 
and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 780-81 (1956) (observing that “giv[ing] 
the word ‘know’ in the M’Naghten Rules a wide meaning . . . would meet the principal 
current criticism of the Rules”); cf. FINGARETTE, supra note 61, at 239 (accepting the 
M’Naghten standard as “a formula which in its core (‘defect of reason from disease of 
the mind’) is correct and entirely general” and arguing it “can stand as an adequate test 
if properly interpreted, retained in full, and rendered somewhat more flexible in certain 
respects”). 
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“know” for the jury, those that do or explore its meaning in case law 
typically hold that knowledge requires “insight” or an ability to 
“understand” or “appreciate” the character and consequences of one’s 
act.67 Courts have also recognized that knowledge requires rationality 
and a sufficient capacity to reason.68 Contemporary forensic 
 
 67 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 49-50; SCHOPP, supra note 64, at 35; Moore, supra 
note 16, at 680 (“Many jurisdictions give ‘know’ a different meaning specific to the 
M’Naghten test. To know . . . it is commonly said in this context, is to emotionally 
appreciate the things that are worthy of such appreciation. Knowledge it is said, must 
be knowledge that is emotionally driven home to the one whose knowledge it purportedly 
is.”). According to Abraham Goldstein, trial courts in eleven states instruct juries that 
knowledge means understanding that enables a person to judge “the nature, character, 
and consequences of the act charged against him” or the “capacity to appreciate the 
character and to comprehend the probable or possible consequences of his act.” 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 49-50; see, e.g., People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 761 (Cal. 
1985) (holding that “‘knowing’ in the sense of being able to verbalize the concepts of 
right and wrong was insufficient to establish legal sanity[;] [r]ather, the defendant must 
‘know’ in a broader sense — he must appreciate or understand these concepts”); 
Johnson v. State, 76 So. 2d 841, 844 (Miss. 1955) (“[T]he test of criminal responsibility 
is the ability of the accused, at the time he committed the act, to realize and appreciate 
the nature and quality thereof — his ability to distinguish right and wrong.”); State v. 
Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505, 521-22 (Wis. 1962) (recognizing that “real insight” is necessary 
to “be able to make a normal moral judgement” and “appreciate and evaluate” an act at 
the time committed). 
 68 See, e.g., State v. Davies, 148 A.2d 251, 255 (Conn. 1959) (affirming this charge: 
“To be the subject of punishment, an individual must have mind and capacity, reason 
and understanding enough to enable him to judge of the nature, character and 
consequence of the act charged against him, that the act is wrong and criminal, and that 
the commission of it will justly and properly expose him to penalty”); Camp v. State, 
149 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (“The only issue presented under the 
defense of legal insanity is whether the accused, at the time of the unlawful act alleged 
to have been committed by him, had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was 
doing an act that was wrong.”); Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 330 (1847) (“A person, 
therefore, in order to be punishable by law . . . must have sufficient memory, 
intelligence, reason and will, to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong in 
regard to the particular act about to be done; to know and understand that it will be 
wrong, and that he will deserve punishment by committing it.”); State v. Rawland, 199 
N.W.2d 774, 785 (Minn. 1972) (“The defendant will be excused if at the time of the 
criminal act he had a mental disease or defect which included among its symptoms or 
consequences an impairment in one or more of the psychological functions requisite 
for reasoning (i.e., cognitive ego functions (perceiving, remembering, classifying, 
judging, etc.)) which, in turn, reduced the strength of his disposition to token ‘this is 
wrong’ to a negligibly low value . . . .” (quoting Joseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, 
The Virtues of M’Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 808 (1966))); Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 
993, 996 (Tenn. 1930) (“The general rule is that if a defendant has capacity and reason 
to enable him to distinguish the difference between right and wrong as to the particular 
act he is then doing, he is criminally responsible for such act.”). Indeed, the examples 
provided in M’Naghten — when differentiating between motivations that would 
inculpate and those that would exculpate under the insane delusion rule — demonstrate 
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psychologists have identified functional abilities relevant to insanity 
evaluations as including: (1) the possession of knowledge that an act is 
prohibited by law or contrary to society’s moral views, (2) an ability to 
retrieve that knowledge, (3) a “capacity to understand how that 
knowledge may apply — and its implications — in relation to one’s own 
situation or a given set of facts,” and (4) the ability to “rationally 
evaluate the potential risks and consequences” of doing the relevant 
action.69 A common critique of the M’Naghten standard is that it 
embodies a cognitive test that ignores the affective and volitional 
aspects of human behavior.70 However, M’Naghten’s focus on reason 
need not have such restricted meaning.71  
Regardless, if these understandings of “knowledge” as involving 
appreciation and a capacity to reason are correct, then the insane 
delusion rule merely sets forth a narrow, easy case for insanity: it 
establishes that intellectual ignorance of the factual predicate necessary 
for wrongfulness (due to delusions from a mental disease) belies 
knowledge of wrongfulness. In addition, awareness of the factual 
predicate necessary for wrongfulness — in an absence of other evidence 
of general insanity — does not establish irresponsibility. 
However, these conclusions only hold true if the phrase “partial 
delusion only, and is not in other respects insane,”72 signifies that the 
accused’s reasoning powers (outside the delusion itself) were intact at 
the time of the criminal act. Otherwise, the negative component of the 
insane delusion rule — the defendant “would be liable to punishment” 
if the perceived facts would not have justified or excused her act73 — 
would withhold the general insanity test from any person whose 
delusion happened not to conform to a legally recognized defense, 
 
the importance of intact reasoning abilities. See M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211 
(distinguishing between killing for self-defense and for revenge).  
 69 Randy Borum, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, in EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 193-
204 (Thomas Grisso ed., 2d ed. 2003). Scholars have offered compilations of relevant 
functional abilities as well. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 253, 255 (2000) [hereinafter Rationality and Responsibility] (arguing 
that legally responsible agents “must be capable of rational practical reasoning” and 
defining “rationality” as, at a minimum, including “the ability to perceive accurately, to 
get the facts right, to form justifiable beliefs, and to reason instrumentally, including 
weighing the facts appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference-
ordering” — “it is the ability to act for good reasons”). 
 70 See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental 
Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 18-19 
(2007). 
 71 See infra notes 367–78 and accompanying text. 
 72 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211. 
 73 Id.  
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assuming she was able to form the necessary level of intent.74 The 
English judges likely conceptualized “partial delusion” as a form of 
disorder limited to the delusion itself. Criminologist Sheldon Glueck 
has noted, along with a number of legal scholars, the judges probably 
were influenced by the discredited ideas of phrenology and monomania 
when drafting the insane delusion rule.75 These theories conceptualized 
the brain as consisting of separate parts, whereby one area could be 
diseased while the others remained wholly unaffected.76 Although a 
common critique is that the rule’s application is limited to people who 
do not exist,77 a “delusional disorder” resembles the condition described 
in the rule.78 Regardless, modern cases typically ignore the “partial 
delusion” language and apply the rule in cases where other aspects of 
mental disorder are clearly evident, as with schizophrenia.79 The next 
 
 74 Wayne R. LaFave observed the M’Naghten insane delusion rule can be read to 
have an “affirmative part” and a “negative part.” LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 7.2(b)(5) 
“[T]he affirmative part” declares insane “a person suffering from delusions [who] 
imagines facts which, if true, would justify his acts.” Id. “[T]he negative part . . . bars[] 
an insanity defense if the facts regarding which the delusion exists would not constitute 
a defense if true . . . .” Id. 
 75 See GLUECK, supra note 46, at 169 n.1, 170; G.W. KEETON, GUILTY BUT INSANE 193 
(1961); OPPENHEIMER, supra note 43, at 215; Weihofen, supra note 44, at 63-64. But cf. 
Morris, supra note 53, at 322 (arguing the M’Naghten rules have outlasted monomania 
and phrenology because the judges based the rules on legal and social responsibility, 
not psychological categories). 
 76 See WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 110 (describing “monomania” as “essentially a 
state of mind characterized by the predominance of one insane idea, while the rest of 
the mind was normal” and “phrenology” as the “theory that the brain was a bundle of 
some twenty-seven different organs presiding over the different traits of the 
individual”). 
 77 See, e.g., CHARLES MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 198, 200 (1926) (“There is 
not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is 
not in other respects insane.”); WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 109 (“The rule applies, they 
said, only in cases where the person is ‘labouring under such partial delusion only, and 
is not in other respects insane.’ A person ‘not in other respects insane’ could, of course, 
quite rightly be expected to reason about the subject of his own delusion as well as a 
sane man. The difficulty is that no such person exists.”); Morris, supra note 53, at 323 
(“When the best psychological knowledge of the time included this idea of monomania 
the judge could not be blamed for making room for it. Nevertheless, the difficulty is 
that no such person as envisaged in this part of the M’Naughten Rules exists.”). 
 78 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 3, at 90-91 (defining a delusional disorder 
as the presence of one or more delusions for a month or longer in a person who, except 
for the delusions and their behavioral ramifications, does not appear odd and is not 
functionally impaired). Dennis Klinck made this observation about monosymptomatic 
psychosis. Klinck, supra note 40, at 463. 
 79 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2020); Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1271-74 
(10th Cir. 2007); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84-85 (Nev. 2001). On the other hand, 
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Part discusses jurisdictions’ current use of the insane delusion rule, 
their procedural variants, and their impact on a residual general insanity 
defense. 
II. JURISDICTIONS’ USE OF THE INSANE DELUSION RULE 
An examination of current case law finds that most M’Naghten 
jurisdictions simply analyze a defendant’s alleged delusions within the 
context of the general right-and-wrong test.80 However, nine 
jurisdictions — California, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Texas, federal courts, and military courts — give special 
significance to a defendant’s delusions.81 Of these, only Nevada 
expressly precludes an insanity defense for a person whose delusion, if 
true, would not justify or excuse her act.82 Although some of the case 
law is quite murky, the remaining eight jurisdictions appear to allow a 
person afflicted with delusions to establish her insanity either through 
operation of the insane delusion rule or satisfaction of the general 
insanity test.83 Yet, as subpart B below demonstrates, the rule in these 
jurisdictions may operate in a way that impedes a defendant’s general 
insanity claim.84  
A. Negative Aspect: Not Insane if Fail to Satisfy Rule 
Only delusional defendants in conformity with the insane delusion 
rule are irresponsible in Nevada. A Nevada statute provides: 
[T]he burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
 
Tennessee appears to limit the rule to defendants with intact reasoning capabilities. See 
Overton v. State, 56 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tenn. 1933). 
 80 See Dixon v. State, 668 So. 2d 65, 67, 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Roberts, 
876 N.W.2d 863, 867-71 (Minn. 2016); State v. Petrie, 69 N.E.3d 150, 152-57 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2016). 
 81 See § 16-3-3; United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319, 324-26 (C.A.A.F. 2013); People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 906, 912 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial of reh’g; Martin v. State, 110 So. 
3d 936, 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Finger, 27 P.3d at 84-85; Dukes v. State, 499 
P.2d 471, 476 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 994 (Tenn. 
1930); Miller v. State, 940 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). 
 82 See infra Part II.A. 
 83 See infra Part II.A. 
 84 See infra Part II.B. 
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(a) Due to a disease or defect of the mind, the defendant was 
in a delusional state at the time of the alleged offense; and 
(b) Due to the delusional state, the defendant either did not: 
(1) Know or understand the nature and capacity of his 
or her act; or 
(2) Appreciate that his or her conduct was wrong, 
meaning not authorized by law.85 
Nevada apparently does not offer other ways to demonstrate an inability 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s act, such as a lack of cognitive 
abilities to process information, retain information, reason, or 
understand.86 In essence, the state supreme court reduced the 
wrongfulness prong of the insanity standard to a strict application of 
the insane delusion rule. 
Dissatisfaction with the general right-and-wrong test inspired this 
narrow interpretation of M’Naghten.87 Between 1889 and 1995, Nevada 
recognized the general right-and-wrong test as well as the positive and 
negative aspects of the insane delusion rule.88 In 1964, the state 
supreme court clarified that delusional insanity was merely a species of 
general insanity.89 Nevada trial courts apparently interpreted the 
M’Naghten test broadly and, over time, dissatisfaction with the insanity 
standard grew.90 The Legislature was concerned that courts “had simply 
improperly analyzed [cases involving insanity] by not considering the 
relationship of delusions to wrongfulness and criminal intent as 
 
 85 NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6) (2020). 
 86 See Brown v. State, No. 77962, 2020 WL 3474157, at *1 (Nev. June 24, 2020) 
(“The insanity defense is ‘very narrow,’ and a defendant is entitled to jury instructions 
on it only if he presents evidence that he acted under a delusion and his ‘delusion, if 
true, would justify the commission of the criminal act.’”). Little case law exists on the 
issue, but the Nevada Supreme Court has rejected arguments that cognitive 
impairments other than delusions are cognizable under its insanity standard. See Gray 
v. State, No. 61987, 2014 WL 4922871, at *4 (Nev. Sept. 29, 2014) (characterizing 
expert testimony that the defendant’s posttraumatic stress disorder “caused ‘his 
thoughts and actions [to be] adversely affected and/or slowed’” as irrelevant to insanity 
because “no evidence was proffered to show that [his] PTSD caused him to be delusional 
. . . [nor] prevented him from understanding the nature of his conduct or appreciating 
its wrongfulness”). 
 87 Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 76-77 (Nev. 2001). 
 88 See State v. Lewis, 22 P. 241, 247-48, 252 (Nev. 1889), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1964); see also Sollars v. State, 316 P.2d 
917, 919 (Nev. 1957) (choosing to retain these insanity tests). 
 89 See Kuk, 392 P.2d at 633-34. 
 90 Finger, 27 P.3d at 76-77.  
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required by [the Nevada Supreme Court].”91 In response, the Nevada 
Legislature abolished the insanity defense in 1995 and created a new 
“guilty but mentally ill” plea.92  
In Finger v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court found the Legislature’s 
elimination of the insanity defense violated due process.93 However, the 
Court — likely to make the defense more palatable to prosecutors and 
the Legislature — limited the defense to delusional states that 
demonstrated the cognitive impairments listed in M’Naghten as limited 
by the insane delusion rule.94 The state supreme court emphasized that 
juries and experts must understand that “[t]he ability to understand 
right from wrong under M’Naghten is directly linked to the nature of the 
defendant’s delusional state. Delusional beliefs can only be the grounds 
for legal insanity when the facts of the delusion, if true, would justify 
the commission of the criminal act.”95 In fact, “[u]nless a defendant 
presents evidence that complies with this standard, he or she is not 
entitled to have the jury instructed on the issue of insanity.”96  
To illustrate how the Nevada rule operates in practice, consider the 
hypothetical posed in the Introduction97 and assume the following 
additional facts. On the day of the shooting, Loredo saw his father, 
Edward Loredo, give a high-five to Nick Baughman, an employee, and 
understood this as a reaction to a successful drug shipment. An hour 
later, Loredo believed he overheard Baughman and his father on the 
business’s walkie-talkies detailing how they planned to kill him later 
that day. Fearing for his life, Loredo removed a gun from his desk 
drawer and cut the power to the office in order to disable the 
surveillance cameras and eliminate noise from the fans. Edward Loredo 
walked to the office to determine why the electricity was out. Unable to 
open the door, he kicked it open. Loredo believed his father was holding 
 
 91 Id. at 77. 
 92 Id. at 77-78. 
 93 Id. at 84. 
 94 Id. at 84-85 (“To qualify as being legally insane, a defendant must be in a 
delusional state such that he cannot know or understand the nature and capacity of his 
act, or his delusion must be such that he cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, 
that is, that the act is not authorized by law. So, if a jury believes he was suffering from 
a delusional state, and if the facts as he believed them to be in his delusional state would 
justify his actions, he is insane and entitled to acquittal. If, however, the delusional facts 
would not amount to a legal defense, then he is not insane.”). The Nevada Legislature 
codified the Finger articulation of the M’Naghten standard in 2007. See NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 174.035(6) (2020).  
 95 Finger, 27 P.3d at 85. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See supra INTRODUCTION and notes 1–3.  
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a gun, and he shot and killed him. When Loredo ran out of the office, 
he asked a nearby customer to “take care of my dad.” He then tracked 
down and killed Baughman, who Loredo was convinced would torture 
and kill him to avenge the death of his father. Loredo was charged with 
two counts of first degree murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  
In Nevada, Loredo would receive a jury instruction on insanity for 
the killing of his father because he would be able to adduce evidence 
that, “[d]ue to a disease or defect of the mind, [he] was in a delusional 
state at the time of the alleged offense[,] and [d]ue to the delusional 
state, [he] did not . . . [a]ppreciate that his . . . conduct was wrong, 
meaning not authorized by law.”98 The instruction would include the 
elements of Nevada’s insanity test as well as elements of self-defense. 
However, a court would likely deny Loredo’s request for an insanity 
instruction as to the murder of Baughman. This would appear to be the 
case even if expert testimony established, for example, that at the time 
of the killing Loredo was experiencing significant cognitive 
impairments associated with schizophrenia, such as an impaired ability 
to absorb and interpret information, an impaired ability to make 
decisions based on that information, or problems with his working 
memory.  
B. Affirmative Aspect: Insane if Satisfy Rule 
All nine jurisdictions that follow the insane delusion rule allow a 
delusion’s satisfaction of a legal defense (when that delusion stemmed 
from a mental disease or defect and motivated the criminal act) to 
establish a defendant’s insanity without further inquiry.99 Eight of these 
jurisdictions (all but Nevada) at least theoretically permit a defendant 
to appeal to the general right-and-wrong standard if she fails to satisfy 
the insane delusion test.100 Legal scholars tend to assume the affirmative 
aspect of the insane delusion rule benefits the defendant by clarifying 
how to, or possibly by providing an additional way to, establish 
 
 98 § 174.035(6). 
 99 See supra note 81 and cases cited therein. 
 100 See United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319, 324-26 (C.A.A.F. 2013); People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 
912-13 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial of reh’g; Martin v. State, 110 So. 3d 936, 
938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Dukes v. State, 499 P.2d 471, 474 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1972); Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 994-95 (Tenn. 1930); Miller v. State, 940 S.W.2d 
810, 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2020). 
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insanity.101 An analysis of case law reveals that the rule functions this 
way in some jurisdictions, especially when the defendant holds the 
option of informing (or not informing) the jury of the rule.102 In other 
jurisdictions, however, the insane delusion rule may impair the defense 
by allowing the prosecution to draw the jury’s attention to a defendant’s 
failure to satisfy the rule and by inspiring forensic mental health 
professionals to effectively withdraw a defendant’s delusions from 
consideration in the general right-and-wrong test.  
1. Insane Delusion Instruction if Sufficient Evidence 
Several states — Texas, Georgia, and to a lesser extent Florida — 
employ the insane delusion rule as a species of insanity that, provided 
a sufficient evidentiary basis exists, goes to the jury with a specific 
instruction.103 The practical effect of this version of the rule is to confine 
it to its affirmative aspect: a jury’s attention is only drawn to the legal 
content of a delusion when the jury could conceivably acquit on that 
ground.  
a. Texas 
Although omitted from state treatises and attorney handbooks,104 
Texas has a long history of applying the insane delusion rule.105 Case 
 
 101 See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, at 967 (arguing “the delusion rule when 
properly understood and applied can never work to the disadvantage of the defendant”); 
WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 111 (“If the mistake of fact test is merely an additional test, 
or merely one specific application of the right and wrong test, it is not objectionable.”).  
 102 See supra Part II.A. 
 103 See Shaw v. State, 798 S.E.2d 344, 355 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017); Martin, 110 So. 3d at 
939; Conaway v. State, 663 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Coffee v. State, 184 
S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944) (per curiam); GA. SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY 
INSTR. – CRIM. 3.80.30 (4th ed. 2020). 
 104 See TEXAS CRIMINAL LAWYER’S HANDBOOK § 15:105.1.1-.2 (2020) (discussing the 
insanity defense); 21 TEXAS JURISPRUDENCE, THIRD CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENSES §§ 76-87 (3d 
ed. 2020) (discussing the same). But see TEXAS CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES § 3:1210 (20th 
ed. 2019) (observing that “more recent cases have held that it is ok to identify the 
specific kind of insanity relied upon by the accused” and citing two cases finding the 
submission of both a general insanity charge and an insane delusion charge to be 
proper). 
 105 See Miller, 940 S.W.2d at 812; Coffee, 184 S.W.2d at 280; Merritt v. State, 50 S.W. 
384, 387-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899).  
One unpublished case found the Texas Legislature eliminated the common law 
defense of insane delusion when it enacted a new penal code in 1974. See Brown v. 
State, No. 05-08-00016-CR, 2009 WL 866207, at *6-7 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009). 
However, the court observed that “[s]ince the enactment of the penal code, at least three 
of our sister courts have apparently and implicitly presumed, without expressly 
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law establishes that, when evidence suggests the defendant held an 
insane delusion at the time of the crime, the court should submit two 
instructions to the jury: a general charge on insanity,106 and an 
additional instruction on insane delusion “if the facts as perceived by 
the defendant were true and would constitute a defense to the crime 
charged.”107 Cases stress that, before a trial court issues the latter 
instruction, evidence must have been admitted capable of supporting 
each element of a recognized defense, such as self-defense or 
necessity.108 Without direct evidence on each element of the perceived 
defense, providing an insane delusion charge that includes that defense 
could amount to “an improper comment on the evidence that could . . . 
nudge[] the jury to find what no witness had testified about” and 
erroneously encourage the jury to make a particular inference.109 A valid 
instruction will include the exact elements of the underlying defense — 
including, oddly, elements pertaining to a “reasonable person” 
standard110 — and apply the law to the facts of the case.111 Texas courts 
have applied the insane delusion rule in the context of delusional self-
defense, necessity, and justified force to resist arrest.112 Crucially, even 
if the trier of fact finds the delusion does not conform to a legal defense, 
 
deciding, that the insane-delusion defense is still viable despite the enactment of the 
penal code.” Id. (citing Miller, 940 S.W.2d at 811-15; Zwack v. State, 757 S.W.2d 66, 
69-71 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Conaway, 663 S.W.2d at 55-56). 
 106 TEXAS CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES, supra note 104, § 3:1220 (“It is an affirmative 
defense to prosecution of a criminal action that, at the time of the conduct charged 
against a person, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, he did not know that his 
conduct was wrong.”); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (2019). Texas has defined 
“wrong” in this context to mean “illegal.” Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of proving the affirmative defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04(d) (2020). 
 107 Conaway, 663 S.W.2d at 55; see Coffee, 184 S.W.2d at 280. 
 108 See Miller, 940 S.W.2d at 815.  
 109 Id. at 814. 
 110 See id. at 812 (expressing that an insane delusion charge should include the 
elements of the relevant delusional justification (apparently verbatim), including “while 
in circumstances from which a reasonable person in the accused’s position would not 
have retreated” and “while reasonably believing that deadly force was immediately 
necessary”); Zwack, 757 S.W.2d at 70-71. 
 111 See Miller, 940 S.W.2d at 813; Merritt v. State, 50 S.W. 384, 387-88 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1899). 
 112 See, e.g., Miller, 940 S.W.2d 810 (applying the rule in the context of self-defense, 
apparent danger, and necessity); Zwack, 757 S.W.2d at 66 (applying the rule in the 
context of justified force to resist arrest and deadly force to do the same). 
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it should consider a defendant’s delusion as evidence of general 
insanity.113  
b. Florida 
Florida’s law is less clear on the subject, but it appears that a 
defendant pleading the affirmative defense of insanity based on a 
delusional belief that her act was justified or excused is entitled to an 
instruction on the perceived defense. From 1902 until 2000, Florida 
followed M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule in addition to the general 
right-and wrong test.114 In 1991, the Supreme Court of Florida 
approved a separate instruction on insanity by reason of hallucinations 
or delusions,115 which was incorporated into the Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases in 1997.116 As the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal explained in 2015, this separate instruction on insanity was 
“often, although not always, accompanied by an instruction on the law 
of self-defense” because the instruction on insanity “require[d] the jury 
to find that the ‘act of the person would have been lawful had the 
hallucinations or delusions been the actual facts’ for the defendant to be 
not guilty by reason of insanity.”117  
The Florida Legislature codified the M’Naghten general test for 
insanity in 2000.118 In Rodriguez v. State, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal held this codification enshrined the general insanity test as the 
sole test for insanity and thus rejected the M’Naghten rule for the special 
 
 113 See Miller, 940 S.W.2d at 814 (“Here, Appellant’s claim of insane delusion was 
that Mr. Allen and others had stolen or were conspiring to steal his property. Neither a 
previous theft of Appellant’s property nor a present conspiracy to steal his property 
would justify Appellant seeking out and killing a person he believed to be 
responsible. . . . The ‘insane delusion’ evidence went to the issue of whether Appellant 
knew right from wrong, not whether in reasonable probability his delusion was that he 
should or would kill Mr. Allen in ‘self-defense.’”). 
 114 See Cruse v. State, 588 So. 2d 983, 989 (Fla. 1991); Blocker v. State, 110 So. 547, 
552 (Fla. 1926); Davis v. State, 32 So. 822, 826-28 (Fla. 1902); Wallace v. State, 766 So. 
2d 364, 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 115 Cruse, 588 So. 2d at 989. 
 116 Wallace, 766 So. 2d at 368; FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTR. – CRIM. 3.6(b) (1997) (“A 
person is considered to be insane when: (1) The person had a mental infirmity, disease, 
or defect. (2) Because of this condition, the person had hallucinations or delusions 
which caused the person to honestly believe to be facts things that are not true or real. 
The guilt or innocence of a person suffering from such hallucinations or delusions is to 
be determined just as though the hallucinations or delusions were actual facts. If the act 
of the person would have been lawful had the hallucinations or delusions been the 
actual facts, the person is not guilty of the crime.”). 
 117 Rodriguez v. State, 172 So. 3d 540, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
 118 FLA. STAT. § 775.027 (2020); Rodriguez, 172 So. 3d at 543. 
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treatment of delusions.119 As a result, the instruction on the defense of 
“insanity by reason of hallucinations or delusions” applied only to 
offenses dated prior to 2000.120 Rodriguez held that giving the delusions 
instruction over the objection of the defendant — even if the trial court 
stresses the jury should only apply the instruction if it finds the 
defendant sane under the general insanity test — is error because it 
could suggest the insane delusion rule supplies the only means to 
establish insanity.121 Instead, a jury may consider a defendant’s 
delusions “as evidence” to decide whether the defendant had “a mental 
infirmity, disease, or defect, . . . [and] whether this condition caused 
[the defendant] at the time of the offenses to not know what he was 
doing or the consequences of his actions, or whether he knew that what 
he was doing was wrong.”122 
However, a Florida defendant pleading insanity based on a delusional 
perceived justification appears still to be entitled to jury instructions 
both on general insanity and on the underlying delusional defense — 
although likely not to an insane delusion instruction. In Martin v. State, 
the defendant, charged with aggravated assault on a law enforcement 
officer, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and argued he 
discharged a firearm because his paranoid delirium made him feel as 
though “people were sneaking up on him” and his life was 
threatened.123 The trial court, however, excluded mental health 
testimony pertaining to self-defense and refused to instruct the jury on 
that defense.124  
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal found both the trial 
court’s exclusion of the evidence and refusal to instruct the jury on self-
defense were erroneous.125 The court reasoned that “[a] defendant has 
a fundamental right to present witnesses and offer evidence relevant to 
his defense”126 and that “[e]vidence that Appellant’s delirium arguably 
caused him to believe his life was in danger, which would have 
explained why he discharged his firearm, unquestionably tended to 
create a reasonable doubt regarding the motivation for his actions.”127 
In support of its holding that self-defense evidence can be relevant to 
 
 119 Rodriguez, 172 So. 3d at 543. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See id. at 544-47. 
 122 Id. at 545. 
 123 Martin v. State, 110 So. 3d 936, 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 939-40. 
 126 Id. at 938. 
 127 Id. at 939. 
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an insanity claim, the court quoted the state supreme court in Blocker 
v. State, a 1926 case that expressly applied the insane delusion rule.128 
The appellate court in Martin reasoned: “Just as the supreme court 
observed in Blocker, the evidence tending to show Appellant felt 
threatened by the deputies at the time of the incident, due to his 
delirium, would support the theory that he acted in self-defense.”129 
Consequently, the trial court erred in excluding “evidence regarding 
whether Appellant’s mental condition caused him to fear for his life.”130 
The trial court also erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense 
because “there was sufficient evidence in the record indicating his 
condition may have caused him to believe his life was in danger . . . [so] 
the instruction on self-defense was ‘necessary to allow the jury to 
properly resolve all issues in the case.’”131  
Ultimately, Florida law is murky on how delusions of justification 
meld with the general right-and-wrong test for insanity. Martin neither 
discussed the insane delusion rule nor the relationship of delusions to 
general insanity, and language in the opinion appears to treat self-
defense as a defense distinct from that of insanity.132 Yet, this case 
cannot be about self-defense per se because, as the trial judge held, the 
defendant in Martin produced no evidence to support the “reasonably 
believes” element of self-defense.133 Subsequent cases have 
characterized Martin as involving a request for a self-defense instruction 
to support the defense of insanity under an insane delusion theory.134 
Florida treatises do not resolve the question, as they avoid discussing 
Martin and the current status of delusions within Florida’s insanity 
law.135 
 
 128 Blocker v. State, 110 So. 547, 552-53 (Fla. 1926). 
 129 Martin, 110 So. 3d at 939. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 940 (quoting Langston v. State, 789 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001)). 
 132 See, e.g., id. at 940 (“[T]he State does not cite any authority for the proposition 
that improperly rejecting a valid defense is harmless if the defendant has another 
defense to offer.”). 
 133 See FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2020). 
 134 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 172 So. 3d 540, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) 
(stressing that Martin requested the self-defense instruction after presenting testimony 
“that his state of delirium could have caused him to act to protect himself because he 
believed his life was in danger” and distinguishing Martin from the instant case, where 
the defendant “objected to the State’s request that the court give the jury a self-defense 
instruction, reiterating that he was not claiming self-defense, even if his hallucinations 
and delusions were taken as true”). 
 135 See 4 FLORIDA CRIMINAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL § 21.3 (2020) (speculating that 
applying the general test for responsibility is “probably the proper approach to [insane 
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c. Georgia 
Georgia employs the insane delusion rule in a unique manner: the 
rule serves as a component of the defense of delusional compulsion, 
which constitutes an express exception to the general right-and-wrong 
test for insanity. In Georgia, a person can establish her insanity136 by 
satisfying the general right-and-wrong test137 or by meeting the 
requirements of the delusional compulsion statute.138 The Georgia 
statute for delusional compulsion provides:  
A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time 
of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the 
person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital 
deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion 
as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing 
the crime.139 
Committee notes on earlier versions of these statutory sections140 
explain the statutes were meant to codify the standard set forth in the 
1847 case of Roberts v. State.141  
Although neither Roberts nor the delusional compulsion statute 
specifies that a qualifying delusion must satisfy the elements of a legal 
defense, the Georgia Supreme Court in 1898 explicitly adopted such a 
requirement.142 As the court explained,  
 
delusions], rather than to apply the mistake of fact doctrine to the delusions”); 16 
FLORIDA JURISPRUDENCE 2D CRIMINAL LAW — SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES/OFFENSES § 68 
(2020) (merely including a quotation from Blocker v. State, 110 So. 547 (Fla. 1926)). 
 136 Georgia courts use “insanity” as an umbrella term that includes both the statutory 
definitions of insanity as well as delusional compulsion. See Lawrence v. State, 454 
S.E.2d 446, 449-50 (Ga. 1995) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2020)). 
 137 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (2020). 
 138 See Lawrence, 454 S.E.2d at 449-50. 
 139 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2020). 
 140 Section 16-3-2 was formerly codified as GA. CODE § 26-702 (1933), and section 
16-3-3 was formerly codified as GA. CODE § 26-703 (1933). The language of the former 
versions of each section are nearly identical to the current versions.  
 141 Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 328, 330-31 (1847) (recognizing an exception to the 
wrongfulness test when “the delusion under which [the defendant] laboured had so 
shattered his intellect, as to control his will, and impel him resistlessly to the 
commission of the act, and therefore there was no criminal motive, no wicked or 
mischievous intent, and if these were wanting, he was irresponsible”). 
 142 See Lawrence, 454 S.E.2d at 449 (noting that Georgia case law has included a 
justification component in the delusional compulsion insanity defense since 1898); 
Taylor v. State, 31 S.E. 764, 777 (Ga. 1898) (suggesting that the plaintiff-in-error would 
be relieved from criminal responsibility if “the act [was] connected with the delusion, 
so that it would not be unlawful if the facts about which he were deluded were true”). 
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It is only in those instances where an individual, who is able to 
distinguish right from wrong, commits a criminal act while 
suffering under a delusional compulsion which leads him to 
believe his action is right, i.e., “justified,” that Georgia law 
accepts insanity as a defense. Hence, “if the delusion is as to a 
fact which would not excuse the act with which the prisoner is 
charged, the delusion does not authorize an acquittal of the 
defendant.”143 
Thus, when determining whether a delusional compulsion excuses a 
defendant’s act, a Georgia court will assess whether the defendant 
suffered from a delusion at the time of the crime, whether the delusion 
was connected to the crime, and whether, if the facts of the delusion 
had been true, the defendant would have been justified or excused in 
her actions.144 This defense operates independently of the right-and-
wrong test.145 
*** 
Returning to the hypothetical developed above, a trial court in Texas, 
Georgia, or Florida would permit Robert Loredo to adduce evidence of 
his genuine (but delusional) belief that the killings were immediately 
necessary to preserve his life. In addition, Loredo would be entitled to 
instructions both on a general insanity defense and on self-defense, so 
long as he adduced evidence capable of supporting those defenses. 
However, Loredo would likely not be able to support a self-defense 
instruction for the killing of Baughman because he could not satisfy the 
imminence requirement.  
 
 143 Lawrence, 454 S.E.2d at 450 (quoting Mars v. State, 135 S.E. 410 (Ga. 1926)). 
 144 Shaw v. State, 798 S.E.2d 344, 355 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Appling v. State, 
474 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 145 Georgia case law demonstrates the insane delusion rule may provide for acquittal 
even when the wrongfulness prong of the general insanity defense would not. See 
Stevens v. State, 350 S.E.2d 21, 22-23 (Ga. 1986) (reversing a murder conviction where 
overwhelming evidence showed that “at the time the defendant killed his wife he was 
operating under the delusion that she was possessed by satan and that he, the defendant, 
was defending himself against satan’s physical attacks and attempts to trap and destroy 
him, as well as putting an end to the evil and destruction in the world caused by satan,” 
and thus the “evidence demanded a finding that the defendant met the justification 
criterion for a defense of delusional compulsion,” even though evidence suggesting 
knowledge of wrongfulness — namely the defendant had cleaned his wife’s blood from 
his vehicle’s windows, hidden his bloody clothes, and asked about Georgia’s death 
penalty — supported the trial court’s rejection of the general insanity defense); Brown 
v. State, 184 S.E.2d 655, 658 (Ga. 1971) (holding the defendant was entitled to a 
delusional compulsion instruction, even if she could distinguish right from wrong at 
the time of the killing). 
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In Texas, so long as direct evidence in the record supported the 
defense, Loredo would be entitled to an insane delusion instruction.146 
The instruction pertaining to the charge of murdering his father would 
likely look like this:  
Jurors must find the defendant not guilty of the first degree 
murder of Edward Loredo if they believe, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, 
the defendant was suffering from an insane delusion as to the 
facts then existing, which caused the defendant to believe that 
Edward Loredo was participating in a conspiracy to traffic 
drugs, that Edward Loredo had voiced his intent to kill the 
defendant on the day of the killing, and that Edward Loredo was 
brandishing a gun at the moment of the killing, and thus that 
the defendant reasonably believed the deadly force was 
immediately necessary to protect himself against Edward 
Loredo’s immediate use or attempted use of unlawful deadly 
force.147  
In this way, the jury’s attention would be focused on the legal 
requirements of self-defense and the factual findings that must be made 
for the defendant’s delusion to conform to that defense.  
On the other hand, in Georgia, Loredo would receive a delusional 
compulsion instruction after receiving an instruction on the general 
right-and-wrong test.148 The instruction would inform the jury that, 
should it find the defendant could distinguish between right and wrong, 
it still must find him irresponsible if a mental delusion overpowered his 
will such that he lacked the intent to commit the crime.149 The 
instruction would clarify that, to acquit on these grounds, the jury must 
find the defendant was actually laboring under the delusion at the time 
of the act and believed facts that, if true, would have justified the 
action.150 The jury also would receive an instruction on self-defense.151  
 
 146 Conaway v. State, 663 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); see Coffee v. State, 
184 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944) (per curiam). 
 147 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31, 9.32 (2007) (self-defense); Miller v. State, 940 
S.W.2d 810, 813-14 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (describing proper and improper jury 
instructions in insane delusion cases). 
 148 See GA. JURY INSTR., supra note 103, at 3.80.30. 
 149 See id. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See id. at 3.10.10; see also Woods v. State, 733 S.E.2d 730, 736 (Ga. 2012) 
(holding that, to evaluate a delusional compulsion defense, the jury must be given an 
instruction as to what conduct would constitute justification). 
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A Texas or Georgia court would not issue a similar instruction as to 
the killing of Baughman; the only defense relevant to that murder 
charge would be general insanity. In Florida, current case law indicates 
the defendant would be entitled to a general insanity instruction as well 
as a self-defense instruction, but not to an instruction pertaining 
specifically to insane delusion. 
2. Evidence that “Wrong” Reduces to “Illegal” 
In other jurisdictions — military courts, federal courts, Tennessee, 
and Oklahoma — the insane delusion rule functions as a background 
principle of law used to inform the definition of “wrongfulness” in the 
general right-and-wrong test.152 In essence, the rule’s directive to 
subject delusions to the strict parameters of legal defenses buttresses the 
conclusion that wrongfulness is an objective concept that should mean 
contrary to societal standards of morality.153 Public or societal standards 
of morality typically reduce to illegality, except perhaps in cases of 
delusions involving a deific decree.154 When a defendant believed her 
act was justified because of an insane delusion — and, indeed, had the 
facts been as she believed, her act would have been justified — then, by 
definition, she would have been unable to appreciate her act was 
wrongful.155 On the other hand, when a defendant’s insanity defense 
rests on the perceived justification of her act, a delusion that fails to 
conform to a legal defense will not, without more, establish her insanity. 
In all of these jurisdictions, however, a defendant whose delusion fails 
the insane delusion test can still argue that she satisfies the general test 
in that she lacked the cognitive abilities necessary to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of her act.156  
United States v. Mott, a case before the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, provides a good example of how the insane delusion rule may 
 
 152 See United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319, 324-26 (C.A.A.F. 2013); Dukes v. State, 499 P.2d 471, 476 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1972) (quoting Kennamer v. State, 57 P.2d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936)); 
Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930). 
 153 See Ewing, 494 F.3d at 619-20 (observing that the English judges’ answer 
concerning the relationship of insane delusions to responsibility illustrates “that the 
right-versus-wrong test asked not whether the defendant believed he was justified based 
on his delusional view of reality, but whether society would judge his actions an 
appropriate response to his delusions”); Mott, 72 M.J. at 325-26. 
 154 See State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1321 (N.J. 1990). 
 155 People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 762 n.13 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the insane 
delusion rule and observing that the delusion that the defendant is defending himself 
“results in an inability to appreciate that the act is wrong”); see supra notes 53–54. 
 156 See M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (HL). 
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inform the definition of wrongfulness and rebut an insanity defense 
premised on a perceived justification.157 Richard R. Mott slashed the 
throat of Seaman Recruit JG — while “shouting ‘you raped me’ or ‘he 
raped me’” — after believing he heard JG tell another crew member on 
the previous day that he planned to kill Mott and his family.158 
Diagnosed with severe paranoid schizophrenia, Mott delusionally 
believed that a large gang of men, including JG, had raped him several 
years earlier.159 “The examining psychiatrist concluded that, at the time 
of the offense,” Mott “believed that ‘he was acting in self-defense,’ that 
‘the only way to stop [JG from killing him] was to attack [JG],’ and that 
his actions were ‘justified and not wrong.’”160 Mott was charged with 
attempted premeditated murder and was convicted by a general court-
martial.161 
On appeal, Mott argued the military judge erred in providing “a 
purely objective standard for wrongfulness.”162 The appellate court 
rejected that contention and concluded that wrongfulness means the 
same thing in Article 50a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice “as in 
M’Naghten’s Case and its accompanying common law.”163 After 
exploring M’Naghten’s understanding of wrongfulness and quoting the 
insane delusion rule, the court held that “wrongfulness” should be 
determined using an objective standard.164 It reasoned that “[s]ociety 
formally expresses its determinations of ‘right and wrong’ and ‘public 
morality’ through law[,]” and “[r]arely would an allegedly illegal act not 
also be wrongful morally.”165 The court continued: 
Thus, “appreciating wrongfulness” is the accused’s ability to 
understand and grasp that his conduct violates society’s 
essential rules, and is supported by an accused’s understanding 
that his conduct violated the law, and is contradicted by 
 
 157 Mott, 72 M.J. at 324-25. See generally Defense of Lack of Mental Responsibility, 
10 U.S.C. § 850a(a) (2018) (providing the affirmative defense of lack of mental 
responsibility). 
 158 Mott, 72 M.J. at 321-22. 
 159 Id. at 322. 
 160 Id.  
 161 Id. at 321. 
 162 Id. at 323. 
 163 Id. at 324. 
 164 Id. at 326. 
 165 Id. (quoting State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1321 (N.J. 1990)). 
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evidence that — if the facts of the accused’s delusions were true 
— then his conduct would not violate the law.166  
The court noted it “need not ultimately define the distinction, if any, 
between legal and moral wrong, as in this case Appellant argued that he 
acted in perceived self-defense, and that Appellant’s mental illness 
prevented him from appreciating that the attempted killing was 
wrongful in any sense.”167 Subsequent military cases have emphasized 
that a delusion’s failure to conform to a legal defense contradicts the 
accused’s argument that, because of that delusion, she believed her act 
was legal and cohered with society’s moral values.168 
However, a delusion that does not strictly conform to a justification 
or excuse may support a general insanity defense by helping to 
demonstrate an inability to appreciate wrongfulness. The appellate 
court in Mott noted in a footnote that, “while wrongfulness is 
determined objectively, the determination of the accused’s ability to 
‘appreciate’ that wrongfulness is necessarily specific to that accused.”169 
This passage signals the court’s understanding that a delusion, 
regardless of content, may help to establish (along with other symptoms 
of mental disorder) that the accused lacked the cognitive abilities 
necessary for appreciation and sound moral reasoning. The court 
illustrated the interplay of those defensive theories in the case at bar:  
Under the defense theory, Appellant’s schizophrenia not only 
made him think that JG was the gang leader who previously 
raped and tried to kill him and now was back to kill him, but 
also that he faced imminent death and had no option but to kill 
JG. Even if a rational person would have understood that he 
could report JG to the authorities or run away, Appellant 
asserted that he was unable to process these options like a 
rational person, and therefore was unable to appreciate that he 
was not acting in self-defense by attacking JG — that is, 
Appellant was unable to appreciate that attacking JG was 
wrongful.170 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 326 n.5. 
 168 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, ARMY 20160422, 2018 WL 2760056, at *2-3 (A. 
Ct. Crim. App. May 31, 2018) (affirming verdict of guilty because “Appellant acted on 
the impulse to the voice, not because he was under an illusion that he was in imminent 
danger, perceived a threat, or felt justified in his actions” and, “[w]hile revenge is a 
motive, it is not a legal justification or excuse”). 
 169 Mott, 72 M.J. at 326 n.6. 
 170 Id. at 333. 
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As this passage suggests, the tendency of a court (or trier of fact or 
expert witness) to find that a delusion advances a general insanity claim 
may depend in part on how closely the defendant’s delusional belief 
resembles a legal justification or excuse.171 
Other jurisdictions have also used the insane delusion test to construe 
the bounds of “wrongfulness” for purposes of general insanity. In United 
States v. Ewing, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used 
the rule to affirm a conviction where the defendant’s perceived 
justification involved delusions of a mind-reading conspiracy and illegal 
deprivation of property — situations that would certainly not justify 
arson or the use of a destructive device.172 Other federal courts have 
affirmed the rule expressed in Ewing.173 In Davis v. State, the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee endorsed the notion that “a homicide committed 
under an insane delusion is excusable, if the notion embodied in the 
delusion and believed to be a fact, if a fact indeed, would have excused 
the defendant.”174 Thus, if a defendant’s delusion had led her to believe 
she was acting in legal self-defense, she would be excused,175 but a 
delusion’s failure to conform to a legal defense would effectively counter 
the accused’s argument that, because of that delusion, she believed her 
act was justified.176 Oklahoma’s relationship to the insane delusion rule 
is less clear: the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed its 
 
 171 See infra text accompanying note 394. But see infra note 353 (observing that 
bizarre beliefs may also qualify for insanity). 
 172 See United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612-13, 621 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 173 See United States v. Cuebas, 415 F. App’x 390, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Polizzi, 545 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting key language 
favorably in distinguishing the case). 
 174 Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930); accord State v. Shelton, 854 
S.W.2d 116, 122 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (“If the mental disease or defect produced a 
delusion and the notion embodied in the delusion and believed to be a fact would have 
excused the defendant’s conduct if the notion were indeed a fact, then the conduct 
committed under such a delusion is, likewise, excusable.”). 
 175 See Overton v. State, 56 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tenn. 1933); Davis, 28 S.W.2d at 996. 
Other cases applying the rule include Drye v. State, 184 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tenn. 1944), 
and Long v. State, 304 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tenn. 1957).  
 176 See Overton, 56 S.W.2d at 741 (“If in truth Overton’s delusion had led him to 
believe that Scott was making an attack upon him (Overton) at the time of this difficulty, 
and if Overton had believed himself acting in self-defense at that time, he might be 
excused. But the record shows no such state of facts.”). Tennessee’s insanity defense 
underwent a number of legislative changes before returning to the M’Naghten test in 
1995, but at least one unreported case indicates that previous interpretations of “wrong” 
in Tennessee, based on the M’Naghten standard in place before 1977, should apply to 
the current statute. See State v. Arriola, No. M2007-00428-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 
2733746, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2009). Interestingly, Tennessee has applied 
the insane delusion rule almost exclusively in the context of delusional provocation. 
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allegiance to the rule in a case syllabus in 1973,177 but the only case 
applying it has been a 2007 federal habeas case that used the rule to 
hold an insanity acquittal would be unavailable to a defendant who 
killed because of a delusion that the victim “had committed numerous 
rapes and arsons” in the past.178  
Using the insane delusion rule to reach the conclusion that “wrong” 
generally means “illegal” dictates the way perceived justifications are 
received by court actors — and this receipt appears to differ from that 
in jurisdictions that define “wrong” more broadly (or not at all). 
Jurisdictions that do not define “wrong” for the jury179 often permit a 
broader, more general understanding of legal defenses — particularly 
self-defense or necessity — to permeate insanity cases. In these 
jurisdictions, the defendant’s subjective sense of justification may factor 
into the general right-wrong calculus without subjecting that 
justification to the strict requirements of the law.180 In essence, 
subjectively feeling justified — when the facts, as believed, were 
generally consistent with the basic thrust or gist of the justification 
(even if, admittedly, quite warped) — will militate in support of the 
defendant’s general insanity claim. One practical advantage of such an 
approach is it avoids probing the complexities of a delusion and the 
 
 177 See Dukes v. State, 499 P.2d 471, 476 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (quoting 
Kennamer v. State, 57 P.2d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936)); see also Kennamer v. State, 
57 P.2d 646, 648 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936) (syllabus by the court). 
 178 Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1274 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 179 See, e.g., Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 500-01 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); State v. 
Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1178-79 (La. 1979); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 
497 (Wash. 1983). 
 180 See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 668 So. 2d 65, 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (reversing a 
conviction for attempted murder of a police officer in part because of “evidence that the 
appellant was suffering from a delusion that the assault was necessary to ensure the 
appellant’s safety”); Moler v. State, 782 N.E.2d 454, 458-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(reluctantly affirming conviction but emphasizing the near certain “conclusion” that 
the defendant held a “‘firmly sustained’ belief that [the victim] was a witch from which 
he needed to protect himself” without mentioning that the perceived facts, if true, 
would not have permitted deadly force); State v. Roy, 395 So. 2d 664, 668 (La. 1981) 
(reversing a conviction where the defendant was “markedly preoccupied with blacks 
and their ‘evil’ nature” and felt that “he was going to war for his country” and was 
“executing God’s will”); State v. Dangerfield, 214 So. 3d 1001, 1018-19 (La. Ct. App. 
2017) (finding that Louisiana courts, to reverse a conviction on grounds of insanity, 
typically require a showing that the defendant “articulated to a degree [her] belief that 
there was some justification” for her alleged criminal act and briefly discussing relevant 
cases); State v. Chanthabouly, 262 P.3d 144, 162 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (approving the 
trial court’s decision to permit the defendant to introduce evidence and argument that 
he acted under a delusional belief of self-defense without reference to the elements of 
that defense).  
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imagination of the delusional defendant to determine if all the 
preconditions of a legal defense would have been satisfied had the 
delusion been real.181 Therefore, in tethering the trier of fact’s 
understanding of a delusional, perceived justification to the strict 
contours of the legal defense, this use of the insane delusion rule may 
serve to narrow the scope of the insanity defense as compared to those 
jurisdictions that do not use the rule in this manner — but, again, this 
is a result of strictly defining “wrongfulness” as “legal wrong” in such 
cases. 
*** 
If Robert Loredo’s case were tried in a military court, federal court, 
Tennessee, or Oklahoma, the court would provide a general instruction 
on insanity that includes the right-and-wrong test.182 The court may 
also instruct the jury that wrongfulness means contrary to societal or 
public morality and that knowledge of criminality is relevant but not 
dispositive to that inquiry.183 The jury would not receive an instruction 
pertaining specifically to Loredo’s delusion. 
Before the court provided those general insanity instructions, defense 
counsel would likely argue in her closing that Loredo could not have 
appreciated the wrongfulness of his acts because he had schizophrenia 
and was actively psychotic at the time. He was untethered from reality: 
in the throes of his schizophrenia-fueled delusion, Loredo genuinely 
feared that his father and Baughman, part of a drug cartel, were going 
to kill him. He was plagued by hallucinations at the moment of the fatal 
acts: he believed he heard his father detail how he planned to kill Loredo 
later that day, and he thought his father was brandishing a gun when 
his father kicked down the door. Driven by delusions and 
hallucinations, Loredo lacked the ability to accurately perceive the 
external world and his relationship to it — in essence, he lacked the 
capacity for rational thought. Because he genuinely believed his acts 
were justified, the defense could conclude, Loredo could not have 
known his acts were wrong, and the jury must find him not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Loredo’s counsel would support its defense by 
highlighting any additional impairments that could have contributed to 
his irrationality.  
The prosecution’s route would look quite different. As to the killing 
of Loredo’s father, the prosecution would highlight evidence suggesting 
 
 181 See WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 502 (“Only an exceptionally clear-headed lunatic 
would be able to furnish all these details of his delusion.”). 
 182 See 10TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. – CRIM. 1.34 (2d ed. 2011). 
 183 See United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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awareness of wrongdoing, such as Loredo’s cutting the power to the 
office in order to turn off the surveillance cameras and his flight from 
the scene. As for Baughman, the prosecutor would argue that — even 
in Loredo’s delusion-filled mind — Loredo did not believe he needed to 
kill Baughman in self-defense; at most Loredo believed that Baughman 
was participating in a drug distribution scheme and planned to kill 
Loredo at some point in the future. Baughman did not pose an imminent 
deadly threat because Loredo had to track him down to kill him. The 
prosecution may argue that, because Loredo’s defense is that he 
perceived his act to be justified as self-defense, wrongfulness should be 
assessed by the law of self-defense. Had the facts been as Loredo 
believed, the prosecution would conclude, he would not have a valid 
self-defense claim, and Loredo’s insanity defense should fail. 
A judge usually communicates to the lawyers which instructions she 
intends to provide to the jury before closing arguments begin. Because 
Loredo’s insanity defense involves his perceived need for defensive 
force, the prosecution might have requested an instruction on self-
defense as a means to counter the theory of defense. The judge would 
be unlikely to grant this request, however, since the defendant has not 
asserted the justification of self-defense. Thus, such an instruction 
(without provision of an insane delusion instruction) would likely 
confuse the jury. However, if the jury ultimately convicted Loredo of 
Baughman’s murder, an appellate court could sustain the conviction by 
relying on evidence that Loredo’s delusion, if true, would not have 
provided a legal justification for the killing. 
3. Insane Delusion Instruction over Defendant’s Objection 
California’s form of the insane delusion rule has a greater capacity to 
disable a defendant’s general insanity defense than the background rule 
just considered.184 California courts will preemptively issue an insane 
delusion instruction to the jury — even over the defendant’s objection 
— when an insanity defense involves a perceived justification or excuse. 
 
 184 State treatises provide little guidance on the use of the insane delusion rule. See 
4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 86.01A (2020) (standard for insanity) (“An 
insane delusion that the conduct was morally correct under some other set of moral 
precepts would satisfy this part of the M’Naghten test of legal insanity.”); 19 CALIFORNIA 
JURISPRUDENCE 3D CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENSES § 78 (“One who commits an allegedly 
criminal act as the result of an insane delusion must be judged as if the facts with respect 
to which the delusion exists were real.”); 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 4TH 
DEFENSES § 12 (2020) (insane delusion) (“Cases in which the defense has been upheld 
appear to be rare.”); see also 5 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 4TH CRIM. TRIAL § 799 
(2020) (instruction to jury) (summarizing People v. Leeds in supplement). 
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Therefore, the jury will be obligated to consider and reach a 
determination on the legal significance of a defendant’s delusion. 
Language of California appellate decisions, paired with related guidance 
from California forensic mental health experts,185 suggest that a 
delusion’s failure to conform to a legal defense is often dispositive to the 
failure of the insanity defense as a whole.  
California has long subscribed to M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule.186 
California applies the general test of insanity187 and defines 
“wrongfulness” as including moral and legal wrongfulness.188 
Interestingly, the force of the insane delusion rule may depend on 
whether the court believes the defendant is alleging an inability to 
understand the legal or the moral wrongfulness of her act.189 
When an insanity case involves a claim of delusional, perceived 
justification or excuse — and does not involve a moral component190 — 
the success or failure of the defendant’s plea will largely turn on whether 
the delusion satisfies the strict elements of the legal defense.191 People v. 
 
 185 See Brandon A. Yakush & Melinda Wolbransky, Insanity and the Definition of 
Wrongfulness in California, 13 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 355, 355 (2013); infra notes 
348–53. 
 186 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 762 n.13 (Cal. 1985); People v. Rittger, 
355 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1960); People v. Hubert, 51 P. 329, 330-31 (Cal. 1897); People 
v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 912 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial of reh’g. 
 187 CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (2020); see also Skinner, 704 P.2d at 758-59 (clarifying 
that, despite the insanity statute’s use of “and” rather than “or,” the test is disjunctive). 
The crime charged must also be the product of insanity “and not the result of sane 
reasoning and natural motives.” People v. Griffith, 80 P. 68, 71 (Cal. 1905). 
 188 See Skinner, 704 P.2d at 760-64. In People v. Coddington, the California Supreme 
Court explained that, while morality “need not reflect the principles of a recognized 
religion and does not demand belief in a God or other supreme being, it does require a 
sincerely held belief grounded in generally accepted ethical or moral principles derived 
from an external source.” 2 P.3d 1081, 1144 (Cal. 2000), as modified on denial of reh’g, 
overruled on other grounds by Price v. Super. Ct., 25 P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001) (internal 
citations omitted). Coddington indicates that even deific decrees must comply with this 
definition of morality in order to establish moral insanity. See id. at 1445 n.37. 
 189 See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
 190 Identifying when a case involves “only” a delusional legal justification requires 
distinguishing moral from legal wrongfulness. California cases suggest, but have not 
held, that morality may differ from legality only in cases involving delusions of a deity 
or supernatural force. See Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914 (quoting Skinner, 704 P.2d at 
783-84 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); People v. Torres, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 
526 (Ct. App. 2005) (involving implied deific authorization). When a defendant 
attempts to defend her actions as comporting with “moral” standards not involving a 
deity or supernatural force, she typically fails. See Rittger, 355 P.2d at 653 (rejecting a 
defendant’s attempt to justify a prison murder by his own “personal, prison-influenced 
standards”).  
 191 See Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 912. 
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Leeds demonstrates the nearly dispositive role that the insane delusion 
test plays in such cases.192 Diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, 
Leeds — similar to Loredo in our hypothetical — killed his father and 
three other individuals under the delusional belief that they were 
involved with a Mexican drug cartel and planned to kill him.193 The trial 
court issued the standard jury instruction on insanity194 and, over 
defense counsel’s objections, instructed the jury on the elements of self-
defense because “the jury needs some basis of making a determination 
of what morally and legally wrong is.”195 The trial court limited the 
jury’s consideration of self-defense: “You may consider any evidence 
defining self-defense only to assist you in determining what may be 
society’s generally accepted moral and legal standards. You should not 
specifically apply the law of self-defense to the conduct of the 
defendant.”196  
A California appellate court disagreed. It found that moral 
wrongfulness was not at issue because the defendant’s “conduct was 
based on the legal doctrine of self-defense.”197 Thus, the jury should 
have focused only on the defendant’s knowledge of the legal 
wrongfulness of his act. The court explained:  
The jury was instructed on self-defense but erroneously 
prohibited from applying it. Without applying the facts as Leeds 
perceived them to the law of self-defense, the jury would have 
no way of evaluating whether his paranoid schizophrenia 
rendered him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his 
actions.198  
The appellate court framed its decision as the natural application of 
M’Naghten’s insane delusion rule.199  
Thus, in cases involving delusional justified force, a California trial 
court should provide instructions on the legal standard for self-defense 
to allow the jury to assess a defendant’s understanding of the 
 
 192 See id. at 914. 
 193 Id. at 909-12. 
 194 Id. at 913 (“[T]he defendant was legally insane if: 1. When he committed the 
crimes, he had a mental disease or defect; [and] 2. Because of that disease or defect, he 
was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or was 
incapable of knowing or understanding that his act was morally or legally wrong.”). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 913-14. 
 197 Id. at 914. Moral wrongfulness typically equates to legal wrongfulness. Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See id. at 912. 
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wrongfulness of her acts.200 However, given the threat is illusory and 
sourced in a mental disorder, the appellate court directed that those 
instructions should be modified to remove any “reasonableness” 
component.201  
The insane delusion rule may carry significant, negative collateral 
consequences. Although a defendant who fails the insane delusion test 
may still argue insanity under the general right-and-wrong test, the 
prosecution and the court will have drawn the jury’s attention to the 
illegality of the defendant’s act had the facts been as she believed, thus 
suggesting her wickedness. In addition, some evidence suggests that 
forensic mental health practitioners in California largely discount 
delusions when applying the general test.202 
Whether the insane delusion rule plays as strong a role in the context 
of moral wrongfulness is less clear. On one hand, California case law 
suggests that, when a defendant alleges moral insanity, the insane 
delusion rule should operate only in an affirmative manner, meaning 
that a delusion’s strict conformance to a legal justification will establish 
an inability to understand wrongfulness, but a failure to conform may 
not be fatal to her claim. As the California Supreme Court explained in 
People v. Skinner, then reaffirmed in People v. Elmore, when the 
defendant’s delusion would have justified the act, the person would not 
have appreciated that her conduct was inherently wrong.203 However, 
 
 200 See id. In accordance with Leeds, the unofficial jury instructions for California 
instruct: “If an insane delusion purports to give rise to the law of self-defense, or defense 
of others, jury instructions must be given as if the perceived facts had been real. If some 
other theory of innocence is involved in the delusion, appropriate instructions will be 
required.” CAL. JURY INSTR., supra note 15, at 4.06. However, at least one subsequent 
unpublished case has interpreted Leeds as not dictating that a trial judge must sua sponte 
issue a self-defense instruction or that counsel must request a pinpoint instruction in a 
case involving delusional self-defense. People v. Harris, No. F071077, 2017 WL 
3141174, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2017). 
 201 Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914. The court suggested this modified wording for 
the context in Leeds: the defendant qualifies as insane “if, because of a mental disease 
or defect that he had when he committed the crimes, he actually believed that he was 
in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury and that the 
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger.” Id. at 914. 
This approach is contrary to that taken in Texas, where “reasonableness” elements are 
retained in insane delusion instructions. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 202 See Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 185, at 365; see also infra notes 348–53 
and accompanying text. 
 203 People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 962 (Cal. 2014) (“A claim of unreasonable self-
defense based solely on delusion is quintessentially a claim of insanity under the 
M’Naghten standard of inability to distinguish right from wrong. Its rationale is that 
mental illness caused the defendant to perceive an illusory threat, form an actual belief 
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when the perceived facts would not have provided a defense, a mental 
disease may still support a finding of moral insanity so long as the 
defendant adduces additional evidence of (a) actual belief that her 
actions were morally justified according to her perception of generally 
accepted ethical or moral principles derived from an external source,204 
or (b) an inability (i.e., a lack of the cognitive abilities necessary) to 
understand the wrongfulness of her act.205 Case law suggests that how 
near the delusion comes to meeting the elements of the perceived 
defense may contribute to the evaluation of whether she actually 
believed her act to be morally right.206 Notably, forensic mental health 
professionals have opined that the narrow definition of morality in 
California basically eliminates the distinction between moral and legal 
wrongfulness.207 If they are correct, a finding that a defendant’s 
perceived justification does not square with a legal defense may be as 
damaging to her insanity defense in cases alleging moral wrongfulness 
as in those alleging legal wrongfulness.208  
*** 
Returning to our hypothetical involving Loredo, a trial court in a 
jurisdiction such as California would likely instruct the jury — as to 
both the killing of Loredo’s father as well as the killing of Baughman — 
in this way:  
A defendant who commits an act that would otherwise be 
criminal is not guilty by reason of insanity if the defendant was 
suffering from an insane delusion, and the facts perceived as 
real as a product of the delusion would have caused the act to 
 
in the need to kill in self-defense, and act on that belief without wrongful intent.”); 
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 762 n.13 (Cal. 1985). 
 204 See People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1113 n.5 (Cal. 2000); supra note 188 and 
accompanying text. 
 205 Cf. Skinner, 704 P.2d at 762 n.13 (observing that the second delusion mentioned 
in M’Naghten — “that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and 
fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury” — “without more, does 
not suggest that the defendant believes his act is lawful or morally justified” (emphasis 
added)). 
 206 See People v. Dennis, No. B236745, 2013 WL 3853178, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
24, 2013) (“Whether appellant acted in revenge or to prevent further harm or death was 
a factor relevant to whether appellant knew that what she did was morally wrong, 
whether or not that factor was also relevant to whether she knew that what she did was 
legally wrong.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 207 Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 185, at 362; see supra note 190 and sources 
therein (discussing the difference between morality and legality in California). 
 208 See Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 185, at 366. 
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be lawful. In the case of [first degree] murder, . . . if the facts 
the defendant perceived as a product of the delusion would have 
justified the exercise of self-defense, . . . the defendant would be 
not guilty by reason of insanity, if the defendant’s acts would 
have been justified had the perceived facts been real.209 
Here, the defendant 
was legally insane if, because of a mental disease or defect that 
he had when he committed the crimes, he actually believed that 
he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great 
bodily injury and that the immediate use of deadly force was 
necessary to defend against the danger.210 
These instructions would be necessary because only by “applying the 
facts as [Loredo] perceived them to the law of self-defense [would] the 
jury [have a] way of evaluating whether his paranoid schizophrenia 
rendered him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his 
actions.”211 As discussed before, the evidence appears to permit the trier 
of fact to find that Loredo — while in the throes of an insane delusion 
stemming from his schizophrenia — believed that his father posed an 
imminent, deadly threat at the time of the killing, thus justifying an 
acquittal by reason of insanity on that charge.212 However, the evidence 
appears not to show that Loredo feared that Baughman posed an 
imminent, deadly threat. Under Leeds, Loredo’s insanity defense would 
fail as to this count unless he could adduce additional evidence that he 
lacked the capacity to reason through the illegality of this act. 
*** 
In conclusion, delusions hold special significance in nine 
jurisdictions in the United States.213 One state — Nevada — limits the 
wrongfulness prong of the insanity standard to the strict application of 
the insane delusion rule.214 Nevadans who fail to satisfy the insane 
delusion rule have no other means to establish their irresponsibility.215 
Three states — Texas, Georgia, and to a lesser extent Florida — employ 
 
 209 See CAL. JURY INSTR., supra note 15, at 4.06. 
 210 People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 914 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on denial 
of reh’g; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(3) (2020) (addressing justifiable homicide). 
 211 Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914. 
 212 See supra note 147 and sources therein. 
 213 See supra note 81 and sources therein; supra Part II. 
 214 See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84-85 (Nev. 2001). 
 215 See id. (“Unless a defendant presents evidence that complies with this standard, 
he or she is not entitled to have the jury instructed on the issue of insanity.”). 
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the insane delusion rule as a species of insanity that, provided a 
sufficient evidentiary basis exists, goes to the jury with a specific 
instruction.216 Thus, a jury’s attention is only drawn to the legal content 
of a delusion when the jury could conceivably acquit on this basis. Four 
jurisdictions — the military system, the federal system, Tennessee, and 
Oklahoma — use the insane delusion rule as a background principle to 
support construing “wrongfulness” as “illegality.”217 California does 
this as well but also transmits an insane delusion instruction to the jury 
— even over the defendant’s objection — whenever an insanity defense 
involves a perceived justification or excuse.218 In such cases, California 
juries must consider and reach a determination on the legal significance 
of a defendant’s delusion.219 
Given M’Naghten’s focus on reasoning,220 the soundness of any 
permutation of the insane delusion rule depends on a deluded 
individual’s ability to exercise rational, moral reasoning about choices 
concerning her delusions. The next Part explores the relationship 
between delusions and moral reasoning. 
III. SCIENCE OF DELUSIONS 
Medical and legal scholars have long criticized the insane delusion 
rule on scientific grounds. In addition to arguments already raised,221 
commentators have argued that delusions may indicate a larger diseased 
mind that produces erroneous reasoning and conclusions,222 and that 
 
 216 See supra note 103 and sources therein. 
 217 See supra note 152 and sources therein. 
 218 See People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 912-14 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified 
on denial of reh’g. 
 219 Id. at 914. 
 220 See supra notes 62–69 and sources therein. 
 221 See supra note 46 and sources therein (requiring those with mental disorder to 
exert sane reasoning); supra notes 75–77 and sources therein (premised on discredited 
scientific theories). 
 222 See STEPHEN, supra note 66, at 160-62 (“A delusion which, considered as a mere 
mistake, has no importance at all, may as a matter of evidence be of the highest 
importance, because though trifling in itself it may indicate profound disturbance of 
every faculty of the mind.”); Cohen, supra note 46, at 39-40 (“Persons suffering from 
delusions of persecution, say as a result of advanced paranoia, are frequently not able 
to reason about them. The delusions are themselves the effects of a disordered mind — 
a mind over which the subject has little or no control.”). But see Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew 
R. Broome & Matteo Mameli, Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the 
Breivik Case, 7 NEUROETHICS 377, 381 (2014) (“[T]he role of delusional beliefs does not 
seem to be different from the role of non-delusional beliefs, unless we assume that the 
presence of delusions also signals the presence of a cognitive deficit that impacts on the 
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the rule treats psychologically similar delusions differently.223 Recent 
discoveries in the cognitive sciences add another dimension to these 
arguments: delusions themselves may signal a disordered process of 
rational thinking, beyond the mere disordered content of thought, 
particularly for decisions related to those delusions.224  
Despite the vast amount of research involving psychotic populations 
and the relatively large literature discussing moral decision-making, few 
modern studies probe the capacity for moral decision-making in 
populations with psychosis, and those that do fail to address decisions 
connected to or emanating from delusions.225 This focus is crucial: to 
establish insanity, a defendant who alleges her act was the product of a 
delusion must establish: (a) the existence of a mental disease, (b) the 
existence of a genuinely held delusion emanating from that mental 
 
decision to commit the crime in question (and at present it would be difficult to find 
empirical support for such a hypothesis).”). 
 223 See LANCELOT FEILDING EVEREST, THE DEFENCE OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES 47 
(1887); GLUECK, supra note 46, at 171 (arguing that the delusion test makes the 
outcome of insanity cases random); RICHARD HARRIS, BEFORE TRIAL 261 (2d ed. 1887); 
ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY 181 (3d ed. 2014); MARC E. SCHIFFER, MENTAL 
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCESS 137-38 (1978); WILLIAMS, supra note 8, § 
161; Klinck, supra note 40, at 463-64; cf. SCHOPP, supra note 64, at 181 (noting that the 
primary significance of delusions is that they reflect disordered thinking); Stephen J. 
Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: 
Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1128-29 (2007) (arguing 
that, if someone is being motivated by psychotic reasons, she should be excused 
whether or not she had delusional beliefs that if true would be a defense). 
 224 See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 7.2(b)(5); Edwin Roulette Keedy, Ignorance and 
Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 87-88 (1908). 
 225 One modern strain of research addressing moral decision-making in 
schizophrenia patients concluded that the capacity for moral decision-making is 
preserved in schizophrenia. Jonathan McGuire, Martin Brüne & Robyn Langdon, 
Judgment of Moral and Social Transgression in Schizophrenia, 76 COMPREHENSIVE 
PSYCHIATRY 160, 161 (2017) [hereinafter Social Transgression]; Jonathan McGuire, 
Martin Brüne & Robyn Langdon, Outcome-Focused Judgments of Moral Dilemmas in 
Schizophrenia, 52 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 21, 21 (2017) [hereinafter Outcome-
Focused Judgments]. However, these studies were designed to evaluate whether 
“capacities for moral judgment are compromised in schizophrenia . . . independent of 
delusions or other characteristic positive symptoms . . . .” Social Transgression, supra, 
at 161. Consequently, the experimental population included schizophrenia patients 
exhibiting mild symptoms. Social Transgression, supra, at 163; Outcome-Focused 
Judgments, supra, at 25. Thus, the conclusion that a “diagnosis of schizophrenia, per se, 
ought not to be considered exculpatory when capacity for moral reasoning is evaluated 
in a legal context” should not be interpreted as foreclosing the possibility that moral 
reasoning may be compromised within the context of an acute delusion. Jonathan 
McGuire, Linda Barbanel, Martin Brüne & Robyn Langdon, Re-examining Kohlberg’s 
Conception of Morality in Schizophrenia, 20 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 377, 380 
(2015). 
  
2021] M’Naghten’s Insane Delusion Rule 1821 
disease, and (c) a causal link between the act and that delusion.226 
Notably, a growing body of psychological and cognitive neuroscience 
literature indicates that delusions are both generated and maintained by 
a constellation of reasoning impairments that impinge on the capacity 
for sound moral decision-making.227 This literature suggests that a 
deluded individual’s capacity for rationality may be particularly warped 
within the context of her delusions.228 Therefore, when evaluating the 
responsibility and blameworthiness of such a defendant, the trier of fact 
must be permitted to evaluate whether the cognitive biases and 
emotional impairments associated with her delusions — considered 
with any other aspects of mental disorder — establish an inability to 
appreciate wrongfulness, regardless of those delusions’ content.229 
A. Moral Decision-Making and the Dual-Process Model 
Comprehending the relationship of delusions to reasoning requires 
familiarity with the leading frameworks of decision-making and moral 
reasoning. In his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman conceptualized a two-part model to understand decision-
making in humans.230 The culmination of decades of research, 
Kahneman’s dual-process model posits an interplay of “System 1”231 
processing — which “operates automatically and quickly, with little or 
no effort and no sense of voluntary control” — and “System 2” 
 
 226 See M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (HL). 
 227 Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 80-83.  
 228 See id. at 82-83. 
 229 See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 7.2(b)(5); Keedy, supra note 224, at 87-88. Whether 
a particular impairment — or constellation of impairments — undermines rationality 
sufficiently to warrant an excuse is ultimately a moral and legal judgment left to the 
trier of fact. See Dean Mobbs, Hakwan C. Lau, Owen D. Jones & Christopher D. Frith, 
Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, in UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX SYSTEMS: DOWNWARD 
CAUSATION AND THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF FREE WILL 243, 249 (Nancey Murphy, George F.R. 
Ellis & Timothy O’Connor eds., 2009) (cautioning that, in light of the view that 
“criminal responsibility is a normative legal conclusion, . . . even the best 
neuroscientific study can only afford factual evidence to be weighed alongside other 
behavioral evidence and normative considerations, rather than actually resolve the legal 
questions as to which factual evidence is relevant”); Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 
84 GEO. L.J. 527, 542, 547 (1996) [hereinafter Brain and Blame]. 
 230 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19-30 (2011).  
 231 Literature employing Kahneman’s dual-process model uses inconsistent 
terminology to refer to each of the processes in the model. For consistency and clarity, 
this Article will refer to the processes exclusively using the word “System.” 
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processing — which reflects conscious, thoughtful decision-making.232 
Kahneman’s dual-process framework is sometimes referred to as having 
a “default-interventionalist” structure, which refers to the relationship 
by which System 1 produces intuition-based responses and System 2 
reviews and, if necessary, modifies those responses.233 In this way, 
System 1 is responsible for a large majority of everyday behaviors, and 
System 2 has the option to effortlessly endorse those behaviors; 
alternatively, System 2 can intervene when it does not endorse a 
behavior or when System 1 is unable to provide an adequate suggestion 
for action.234  
In the field of cognitive neuroscience, Joshua Greene and colleagues 
have applied Kahneman’s dual-process model to explain how humans 
engage in moral decision-making.235 Greene posits that moral decision-
making stems from the competition of a “socio-emotional” pathway and 
a “cognitive” pathway.236 In Greene’s model, the socio-emotional 
pathway parallels System 1, while the cognitive pathway parallels 
System 2.237 Cognitive scientists have tested Greene’s dual-process 
model through use of moral probes, which typically require a person to 
decide between avoiding the commission of a harmful act or saving 
multiple lives.238 Moral probes serve as a useful illustration of Greene’s 
model since committing a harmful act generates an intuitively negative 
emotional response — a System 1 process — which can be overcome by 
focusing on the goal of maximizing the number of lives saved — a 
System 2 process.239 
 
 232 KAHNEMAN, supra note 230, at 20-21 (“[System 2] allocates attention to the 
effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations . . . [and is] 
often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.”). 
 233 Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith E. Stanovich, Dual-Process Theories of Higher 
Cognition: Advancing the Debate, 8 PERSPS. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 223, 227 (2013). 
 234 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 230, at 39-49. 
 235 See Joshua D. Greene, Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley & 
Johnathan D. Cohen, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389, 389 (2004). 
 236 See id. at 389-90. 
 237 See Fiery Cushman, Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for 
Morality, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 273, 285 (2013). 
 238 The paradigmatic moral dilemma is the “trolley” dilemma, where an out-of-
control train is rapidly approaching five people standing on the tracks in its path. 
Participants must decide whether to push a large man in front of the train, thus killing 
the man but saving the five people on the track, or refrain from taking any action, which 
dooms the five people in the train’s path but saves the large man. See Joshua Greene & 
Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 
517, 519 (2002).  
 239 See id. 
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B. Skewed System Processing Within Delusions 
Psychology and psychiatry researchers have demonstrated the 
exaggeration of several cognitive biases in populations with delusions 
beyond the incidence of cognitive biases in the general population. 
Taken together, the cognitive biases in populations with delusions 
indicate an impaired — but not completely abolished — capacity for 
moral reasoning. Section 1 of this subpart will discuss each of the 
cognitive biases commonly exaggerated in psychotic populations with 
delusions and will highlight the effect each bias has on the dual-process 
framework. Section 2 will then explain how the cognitive biases may 
collectively contribute to delusion formation, which reflects a 
potentially reversible deviation from healthy moral decision-making for 
individuals with psychosis. 
1. Exaggerated Cognitive Biases 
Several cognitive biases are notably elevated in populations with 
delusions compared to healthy populations. Each cognitive bias reflects 
either a shift towards an overreliance on System 1 (intuitive/emotional) 
processing or an impaired engagement of System 2 (reflective/cognitive) 
processing. Collectively, the shift away from use of System 2 towards 
overuse of System 1 is indicative of a deluded individual’s impaired 
ability to reflect upon — and thus to appreciate the wrongfulness — of 
her acts.240 
Cognitive biases prevalent in populations with psychosis that reflect 
overreliance on System 1 processing include the jumping-to-
conclusions (“JTC”) bias,241 liberal acceptance,242 and hostile 
attribution bias.243 First, JTC bias refers to “a tendency to make 
decisions with certainty based on insufficient information.”244 This 
data-gathering bias leads actors to quickly gauge ambiguous or 
anomalous information and reach a false (or even delusional) 
 
 240 See Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 82-83.  
 241 See id. at 80-81.  
 242 See Steffen Moritz, Todd S. Woodward & Martin Lambert, Under What 
Circumstances Do Patients with Schizophrenia Jump to Conclusions? A Liberal Acceptance 
Account, 46 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 127, 128-29 (2007). 
 243 See Raymond W. Novaco, Cognitive-Behavioral Factors and Anger in the 
Occurrence of Aggression and Violence, in THE WILEY HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE AND 
AGGRESSION 329, 333-34 (Peter Sturmey ed., 2017).  
 244 Suzanne Ho-wai So, Nicolson Yat-fan Siu, Hau-lam Wong, Wai Chan & Philippa 
Anne Garety, ‘Jumping to Conclusions’ Data-Gathering Bias in Psychosis and Other 
Psychiatric Disorders – Two Meta-Analyses of Comparisons Between Patients and Healthy 
Individuals, 46 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 151, 152 (2016).  
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conclusion without thoroughly evaluating the evidence or considering 
alternatives.245 Recent meta-analyses and systematic reviews have 
“definitively established” the positive correlation between psychosis 
and JTC bias.246 Importantly, JTC bias is not limited to any particular 
mental illness but rather appears elevated in delusional groups across 
various psychiatric diagnoses.247 The specificity of JTC to delusions has 
prompted some scholars to propose that JTC is integral in delusion 
formation.248 JTC bias represents overuse of a System 1 process since it 
reflects reaching a conclusion without gathering and reflecting upon 
sufficient evidence.249 
Next, the reasoning bias termed liberal acceptance also fosters 
premature and incorrect decisions by assigning meaning and 
momentum to weakly supported evidence.250 Essentially, the liberal 
acceptance account posits that deluded individuals more easily (and 
therefore more quickly) accept a hypothesis compared to healthy 
individuals as a result of the lowering of their “subjective threshold of 
significance.”251 A lowered decision threshold results in a deluded 
individual requiring less evidence to adopt a hypothesis, which results 
in premature decisions and an increased rate of error.252 Importantly, 
research shows a positive association between the prevalence of liberal 
acceptance and delusional severity.253 Thus, much like JTC bias, liberal 
 
 245 See Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 80.  
 246 See id. at 80-81. 
 247 See Benjamin F. McLean, Julie K. Mattiske & Ryan P. Balzan, Association of the 
Jumping to Conclusions and Evidence Integration Biases with Delusions in Psychosis: A 
Detailed Meta-Analysis, 43 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 344, 351-52 (2017) (concluding that 
delusional status is a good predictor of JTC bias, whereas a diagnosis of mental illness, 
such as schizophrenia, is not).  
 248 See Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 81. But see Robert Dudley, Peter Taylor, 
Sophie Wickham & Paul Hutton, Psychosis, Delusions and the “Jumping to Conclusions” 
Reasoning Bias: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 42 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 652, 656 
(2016) (arguing that JTC bias is “neither a sufficient or necessary cause of psychosis or 
delusions”).  
 249 See Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 82 (“It is apparent that JTC may reflect the 
operation of [System] 1 fast processes . . . .”). 
 250 See Steffen Moritz, Gerit Pfuhl, Thies Lüdtke, Mahesh Menon, Ryan P. Balzan & 
Christina Andreou, A Two-Stage Cognitive Theory of the Positive Symptoms of Psychosis. 
Highlighting the Role of Lowered Decision Thresholds, 56 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 13-14 (2017). 
 251 Steffen Moritz, Florian Scheu, Christina Andreou, Ute Pfueller, Matthias 
Weisbrod & Daniela Roesch-Ely, Reasoning in Psychosis: Risky but Not Necessarily Hasty, 
21 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 91, 93 (2016). 
 252 Id. at 100.  
 253 See McLean et al., supra note 247, at 350.  
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acceptance represents overuse of System 1 processing and supplements 
the explanation of JTC bias in individuals with delusions. 
In addition to JTC bias and liberal acceptance, populations with 
psychosis ⎯ especially those with persecutory delusions ⎯ also 
demonstrate a hostile attribution bias.254 Hostile attribution bias refers 
generally to responding in a hostile manner to ambiguous cues,255 often 
resulting in anger.256 Further, individuals with persecutory delusions 
tend to focus selectively on negative information and preferentially 
recall negative memories.257 Experimental data show that patients with 
schizophrenia who are exhibiting positive symptoms — including 
persecutory delusions — may have difficulties processing negative 
information,258 which may cause misinterpretation of what others mean 
to communicate.259 In sum, a hostile attribution bias reflects overuse of 
a System 1 process since it causes an individual to reach a premature 
conclusion about an ambiguous cue. 
 
 254 See Erin B. Tone & Jennifer S. Davis, Paranoid Thinking, Suspicion, and Risk for 
Aggression: A Neurodevelopmental Perspective, 24 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1031, 1039 
(2012). 
 255 See id. See generally Thomas Suslow, Christian Lindner, Udo Dannlowski, Kirsten 
Walhöfer, Maike Rödiger, Birgit Maisch, Jochen Bauer, Patricia Ohrmann, Rebekka 
Lencer, Pienie Zwitserlood, Anette Kersting, Walter Heindel, Volker Arolt & Harald 
Kugel, Automatic Amygdala Response to Facial Expression in Schizophrenia: Initial 
Hyperresponsitivity Followed by Hyporesponsitivity, BMC NEUROSCIENCE, Nov. 2013, at 
1, 4 (conducting a study that found that schizophrenia “patients showed an initial 
bilateral amygdala hyperresponsivity to masked neutral faces compared to healthy 
controls”). 
 256 See Novaco, supra note 243, at 333. Notably, psychiatry researchers have 
consistently demonstrated that angry affect mediates a strong association between 
threat-based delusions and risk of committing serious violence. See Jeremy W. Coid, 
Simone Ullrich, Constantinos Kallis, Robert Keers, Dave Barker, Fiona Cowden & 
Rebekah Stamps, The Relationship Between Delusions and Violence: Findings from the East 
London First Episode Psychosis Study, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 465, 467-70 (2013); Simone 
Ullrich, Robert Keers & Jeremy W. Coid, Delusions, Anger, and Serious Violence: New 
Findings from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 
1174, 1176-80 (2014). 
 257 Fumiaki Ito, Kazunori Matsumoto, Tetsuo Miyakoshi, Noriyuki Ohmuro, 
Tomohiro Uchida & Hiroo Matsuoka, Emotional Processing During Speech 
Communication and Positive Symptoms in Schizophrenia, 67 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL 
NEUROSCIENCES 526, 527 (2013). 
 258 See id. at 528-30; Norichika Iwashiro, Yosuke Takano, Tatsunobu Natsubori, 
Yuta Aoki, Noriaki Yahata, Wataru Gonoi, Akira Kunimatsu, Osamu Abe, Kiyoto Kasai 
& Hidenori Yamasue, Aberrant Attentive and Inattentive Brain Activity to Auditory 
Negative Words, and Its Relation to Persecutory Delusion in Patients with Schizophrenia, 
15 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 491, 496-98 (2019). 
 259 Ito et al., supra note 257, at 529.  
  
1826 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1777 
While the cognitive biases reviewed above reflect an overreliance on 
System 1 processing, populations with psychosis also demonstrate 
impaired engagement of System 2 processing. Whereas healthy 
individuals exhibit belief flexibility — defined as a “higher order 
reasoning ability that involves ‘reflecting on one’s own beliefs, changing 
them in light of reflection and evidence, and generating and considering 
alternatives’” — populations with delusions instead exhibit belief 
inflexibility.260 Belief inflexibility relates to impairments in (a) accepting 
the possibility of being mistaken, (b) generating an alternative 
explanation, and (c) changing conviction in response to contradictory 
evidence.261 The first review of the subject, a 2018 meta-analysis, found 
a robust association between belief inflexibility and global severity of 
delusions, with a particularly strong association for delusional 
conviction.262 
Researchers most commonly measure inflexibility in beliefs unrelated 
to an individual’s delusions by assessing her bias against 
disconfirmatory evidence (“BADE”), which refers to the individual’s 
willingness to modify her hypothesis in light of contradictory 
evidence.263 A 2016 meta-analysis of BADE shows an association with 
delusions regardless of psychiatric diagnosis.264 Further, a BADE tends 
to increase with delusional severity,265 may be implicated prior to the 
 
 260 Chen Zhu, Xiaoqi Sun & Suzanne Ho-wai So, Associations Between Belief 
Inflexibility and Dimensions of Delusions: A Meta-Analytic Review of Two Approaches to 
Assessing Belief Flexibility, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 59, 60 (2017) (quoting Philippa 
A. Garety et al., Reasoning, Emotions, and Delusional Conviction in Psychosis, 114 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 373, 374 (2005)). 
 261 See Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 81. 
 262 Zhu et al., supra note 260, at 59, 75 (analyzing sixteen studies, with a total sample 
of 1,065, and finding all dimensions of delusions — conviction, distress, and 
preoccupation — were significantly associated with belief inflexibility). 
 263 See Nicole Sanford, Ruth Veckenstedt, Steffen Moritz, Ryan P. Balzan & Todd S. 
Woodward, Impaired Integration of Disambiguating Evidence in Delusional Schizophrenia 
Patients, 44 PSYCHOL. MED. 2729, 2730 fig.1 (2014) (illustrating a typical task to 
measure BADE). In addition to measuring an individual’s ability (or lack thereof) to 
integrate disconfirmatory evidence, a BADE task can also be used to measure an 
individual’s bias against confirmatory evidence, or BACE. See McLean et al., supra note 
247, at 345 (describing a BACE as the “fail[ure] to adequately up-rate the plausibility 
of the true interpretation despite additional supporting evidence”). Research 
demonstrates that trends in BACE closely mirror those of BADE. See id. at 350 (showing 
that BACE is exaggerated as delusional severity increases and diminishes as delusions 
abate). 
 264 See McLean et al., supra note 247, at 349 (noting that BADE is less prevalent in 
groups with other psychiatric illnesses not experiencing delusions). 
 265 Id. at 350 (noting that a BADE appears “elevated during times of worse delusions, 
and appear[s] lower . . . as delusions abate”).  
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first onset of psychosis,266 and is likely a risk factor for delusion 
genesis.267 Taken together, belief inflexibility demonstrates an 
individual’s inability to integrate inconsistent information in order to 
self-correct behavior, and thus represents impairment of a System 2 
process.268 
Importantly, a phenomenon called hypersalience of evidence-
hypothesis matches (“EVH”) demonstrates both overuse of System 1 
coupled with underutilization of System 2 processes. EVH refers to the 
phenomenon by which individuals with delusions give “inordinately 
high weight” to “encountered evidence [that] matches a hypothesis 
currently held in mind,” even in the face of contradictory evidence.269 
To illustrate EVH, consider that individuals with delusions frequently 
engage in “safety[-seeking] behaviors,” which are “actions designed to 
prevent [a] feared catastrophe from occurring.”270 The non-occurrence 
of a catastrophe following use of a safety-seeking behavior leads the 
individual to incorrectly conclude that she avoided the catastrophe as a 
result of taking preventative action, which leads to endorsement of the 
behavior.271 
For example, imagine an individual with psychosis has a delusional 
idea that she is being spied upon by people who intend to harm her 
(hypothesis).272 While on a crowded bus, she interprets eye contact with 
other riders as evidence that she is being watched, which supports her 
 
 266 See Sarah Eisenacher & Mathias Zink, Holding on to False Beliefs: The Bias Against 
Disconfirmatory Evidence over the Course of Psychosis, 56 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 79, 85 (2017). 
 267 Id. at 87 (holding that a BADE “can be regarded as a cognitive marker of the 
emerging psychotic state”).  
 268 See Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 82 (“[B]elief flexibility (i.e. an ability to 
step back, consider the possibility of being mistaken and reflect on alternative 
explanations) overlaps substantially with the construct of analytic, controlled ‘[System] 
2’ reasoning.”). 
 269 See William J. Speechley, Elton T.C. Ngan, Steffen Moritz & Todd S. Woodward, 
Impaired Evidence Integration and Delusions in Schizophrenia, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 688, 696 (2012). 
 270 Daniel Freeman, Philippa A. Garety, Elizabeth Kuipers, David Fowler, Paul E. 
Bebbington & Graham Dunn, Acting on Persecutory Delusions: The Importance of Safety 
Seeking, 45 BEHAV. RSCH. & THERAPY 89, 90, 93, 94 tbl.2 (2007) [hereinafter Acting on 
Persecutory Delusions] (finding that 96 out of 100 participants with persecutory 
delusions indicated they had carried out at least one safety-seeking behavior during the 
prior month).  
 271 See id. at 90. 
 272 See, e.g., Speechley et al., supra note 269, at 696 (providing an example of EVH 
in which an individual believes the CIA is spying on him or her).  
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hypothesis (evidence-hypothesis matches).273 This belief may be 
maintained even in spite of contradictory evidence, such as some riders 
exiting the bus.274 Feeling threatened, the individual believes she must 
exit the bus and return home (a safety-seeking behavior) in order to 
avoid being harmed.275 Once home, the individual feels safe and 
concludes that removing herself from the bus allowed her to escape 
catastrophe (evidence-hypothesis matches). 
Thus, EVH dovetails neatly with JTC bias and a BADE, whereby 
hypersalience could underlie JTC bias to form a delusion, and a BADE 
prevents the evaluation of disconfirmatory evidence to maintain the 
delusion.276 Further, research indicates that EVH undergirds the 
cognitive biases in psychosis.277 Importantly, EVH may not align with a 
specific psychotic illness but rather may be associated with delusions 
across diagnoses.278 
In order to illustrate how these cognitive biases might operate 
together, consider again the Loredo example. Recall that on the day of 
the killings, Loredo witnessed a high-five between his father and 
Baughman, which Loredo interpreted as a celebration of a successful 
drug shipment. Since Loredo had not witnessed any events leading up 
to the high-five, he exhibited JTC bias by relying on insufficient 
information to conclude that his father and Baughman were celebrating 
a successful drug shipment. Further, liberal acceptance helps to explain 
Loredo’s misinterpretation of the high-five. Loredo already believed that 
a Mexican cartel had infiltrated the family business, which lowered his 
subjective threshold of significance for evidence in support of this 
belief. Thus, although a high-five itself is very weak evidence of a 
successful drug shipment, it still exceeded Loredo’s subjective threshold 
of significance, which led to the delusional conclusion. Moreover, 
 
 273 See, e.g., id. (providing an example of evidence confirming a delusional idea “at 
the expense of disconfirming evidence”). 
 274 See, e.g., id. (providing an example of EVH by showing the inability of 
contradictory evidence disconfirming a delusional idea).  
 275 See Freeman et al., Acting on Persecutory Delusions, supra note 270, at 93 (finding 
that avoidance was the most common safety-seeking behavior used by individuals with 
psychosis in response to situations perceived as threatening in a clinical study).  
 276 See Speechley et al., supra note 269, at 696. 
 277 See generally Ryan Balzan, Paul Delfabbro, Cherrie Galletly & Todd Woodward, 
Confirmation Biases Across the Psychosis Continuum: The Contribution of Hypersalient 
Evidence-Hypothesis Matches, 52 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 53, 58-67 (2013) (discussing 
the findings of a study that investigated whether hypersalience of evidence-hypotheses 
matches is linked to delusion ideation or cognitive biases). 
 278 See id. at 60 (“[T]he bias reported may not be driven by a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia per se, but rather by the delusional symptomology of schizophrenia.”). 
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Loredo demonstrated hostile attribution bias since he reacted negatively 
(and later, violently) after witnessing the high-five, which itself was an 
ambiguous cue.  
Imagine that immediately after witnessing the high-five, Loredo heard 
his father and Baughman excitedly discussing the previous night’s 
football game. Seemingly, a reasonable person would conclude that the 
high-five related to the discussion of the game. However, as a result of 
his psychosis, Loredo exhibited belief inflexibility by failing to integrate 
evidence of the football discussion to modify his conclusion that the 
high-five represented a celebration of a successful drug shipment. 
Considered within the context of EVH, Loredo’s belief that a Mexican 
cartel had infiltrated the family business (hypothesis) led him to 
conclude the high-five reflected his father’s relationship with the cartel 
(evidence-hypothesis matches). Thus, for an individual with psychosis, 
just a brief interaction can implicate a constellation of cognitive biases 
that serve to perpetuate a delusional belief. 
2. Impaired Capacity for Moral Reasoning 
Recent advances in psychosis research have inspired a novel theory 
explicitly integrating delusion formation with Kahneman’s dual-process 
theory of decision-making.279 The theory, developed by Thomas Ward 
and Philippa A. Garety, posits that delusions develop as a result of 
overreliance on System 1 processing, including the JTC bias, and that 
delusions are maintained by a significantly impaired ability to engage in 
System 2 reflective thinking, as demonstrated by belief inflexibility.280 
Since moral decision-making involves the interplay of Systems 1 and 2, 
the impairment of System 2 in delusional individuals implies that 
psychotic populations with active delusions have an impaired capacity 
for moral decision-making, especially as to decisions connected to those 
delusions. 
Although individuals with delusions tend to suffer from impaired 
reflective processing, engagement of System 2 can be improved through 
cognitive therapies, suggesting that the impairment is not absolute. For 
example, clinicians have successfully used cognitive-based therapy 
 
 279 Ward & Garety, supra note 21, at 83. 
 280 Id. (“[A]n over-reliance on fast [System] 1 reasoning processes together with a 
reduced likelihood of the activation of override by slow [System] 2 processes, provides 
the context within which the distressing [delusional] beliefs are maintained and even 
strengthened over time . . . .”). 
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(“CBT”)281 to encourage individuals with persecutory delusions to 
consciously avoid use of safety-seeking behaviors in a feared 
environment.282 CBT relies on the forced engagement of System 2, and 
results have demonstrated a drastic reduction in delusional 
conviction.283 In addition to targeting safety-seeking behaviors, 
researchers have successfully used CBT to target other delusion 
maintenance factors to mitigate delusional conviction.284 Thus, while 
engagement of System 2 may be impaired within the context of a 
delusion, it is not completely abolished.285 
C. Emotional Dysfunctions in Individuals with Psychosis 
Emotional irregularities in populations with psychosis provide 
additional evidence of the compromised ability for moral decision-
making within the context of a delusion. Difficulties in emotion 
regulation skills in psychotic individuals demonstrate a shift from 
System 2 (reflective/cognitive) processing towards System 1 
 
 281 See Tania M. Lincoln & Emmanuelle Peters, A Systematic Review and Discussion 
of Symptom Specific Cognitive Behavioural Approaches to Delusions and Hallucinations, 
203 SCHIZOPHRENIA RSCH. 66, 66 (2019) (“The main instrument of change in [CBT] 
involves reframing appraisals and modifying behavior related to psychotic symptoms, 
to reduce distress and improve functioning and well-being.”). 
 282 See generally Daniel Freeman, Jonathan Bradley, Angus Antley, Emilie Bourke, 
Natalie DeWeever, Nicole Evans, Emma ernis, Bryony Sheaves, Felicity Waite, Graham 
Dunn, Mel Slater & David M. Clark, Virtual Reality in the Treatment of Persecutory 
Delusions: Randomised Controlled Experimental Study Testing How to Reduce Delusional 
Conviction, 209 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 62 (2016) (conducting a study that tested whether 
virtual reality cognitive therapy that discouraged the use of safety-seeking behaviors 
could be effective in treating delusions).  
 283 See id. at 64-66. 
 284 See Daniel Freeman & Philippa Garety, Advances in Understanding and Treating 
Persecutory Delusions: A Review, 49 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1179, 
1180-84 (2014); Lincoln & Peters, supra note 281, at 75-76. 
 285 Another similar type of therapy — termed metacognitive training (“MCT”) — 
targets inhibition of System 1 processing and engagement of System 2 reflective 
thinking. MCT has also been shown as effective in reducing the incidence of delusions, 
adding further support that System 2 is not completely abolished in psychotic 
individuals. For a meta-analysis of the MCT data, see Carolin Eichner & Fabrice Berna, 
Acceptance and Efficacy of Metacognitive Training (MCT) on Positive Symptoms and 
Delusions in Patients with Schizophrenia: A Meta-Analysis Taking into Account Important 
Moderators, 42 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 952, 955-60 (2016); see also Steffen Moritz, 
Christina Andreou, Brooke C. Schneider, Charlotte E. Wittekind, Mahesh Menon, Ryan 
P. Balzan & Todd S. Woodward, Sowing the Seeds of Doubt: A Narrative Review on 
Metacognitive Training in Schizophrenia, 34 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 358, 363-64 (2014) 
(showing preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of MCT “over and above the effect 
of antipsychotic medication[s]”). 
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(intuitive/emotional) processing that parallels the trend resulting from 
exaggerated cognitive biases.286 Taken together, evidence of emotional 
impairments associated with delusions suggest a psychotic individual 
may have a diminished ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of an act 
when that act emanates from a delusion. 
1. Dysfunctional Emotion Regulation Skills 
Deficient emotion regulation skills in populations with psychosis 
cause an overreliance on System 1 processing and impair the use of 
System 2 processing. Emotion regulation is broadly defined as “goal 
directed processes functioning to influence the intensity, duration and 
type of emotion experienced.”287 Populations with psychosis 
demonstrate difficulties regulating negative emotions, which may result 
from impaired use of adaptive strategies, such as cognitive 
reappraisal,288 coupled with overuse of maladaptive strategies, such as 
rumination and suppression.289 In the context of moral reasoning, the 
impaired ability to appropriately control emotions leads to emotionally 
charged decisions with little self-reflection.  
A 2019 systematic review and meta-analysis concluded that emotion 
regulation is “markedly impaired in patients with psychotic 
disorders.”290 The most prominent findings from the study reveal that 
populations with psychosis habitually use more maladaptive and fewer 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies compared to healthy controls.291 
Further, correlative data indicated a positive association between 
 
 286 See Zhang et al., supra note 21, at 5.  
 287 Anett Gyurak, James J. Gross & Amit Etkin, Explicit and Implicit Emotion 
Regulation: A Dual-Process Framework, 25 COGNITION & EMOTION 400, 401 (2011); see 
also Clara Marie Nittel, Tania Marie Lincoln, Fabian Lamster, Dirk Leube, Winfried 
Rief, Tilo Kircher & Stephanie Mehl, Expressive Suppression Is Associated with State 
Paranoia in Psychosis: An Experience Sampling Study on the Association Between Adaptive 
and Maladaptive Emotion Regulation Strategies and Paranoia, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 291, 294-95 tbl.1 (2018) (defining and explaining seven of the most 
prominently used emotion regulation strategies). Adaptive strategies are those 
associated with better mental health outcomes, and maladaptive strategies are 
associated with poorer mental health outcomes. Id. at 293, 296. 
 288 See Nittel et al., supra note 287, at 292, 294 (defining cognitive reappraisal as 
“cognitive change that involves changing the subjective interpretation of an emotion-
eliciting event in a way that alters its emotional impact”). 
 289 See id. at 292, 295 (defining rumination as “passive and repetitive focus on 
negative emotions or symptoms of distress,” and suppression as “conscious inhibition 
of expressive or behavioral components of an emotion”).  
 290 Ludwig et al., supra note 21, at 1. 
 291 Id. at 3. 
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maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and positive symptoms of 
psychosis such as delusions.292  
Other studies demonstrate that engaging in adaptive emotion 
regulation during moral dilemma tasks results in more reason-based 
judgments,293 which represent engagement of System 2.294 Moreover, 
studies using a “process-dissociation”295 approach consistently find that 
engagement of cognitive reappraisal296 — a System 2 process — 
selectively increases reason-based judgments but leaves emotion-based 
judgments unaffected. In other words, using cognitive reappraisal does 
not reduce the intensity of negative emotions evoked by moral 
dilemmas, but rather reappraising the negative feelings leads to 
judgment dominated by reflective reasoning. This finding is consistent 
with Greene’s dual-process theory, whereby intuitively generated 
emotions can be overcome by deliberative self-reflection.297 
Since use of adaptive emotion regulation on moral probes helps to 
overcome intuitively generated emotions to reach a more deliberate 
judgment, it logically follows that individuals with psychosis with 
diminished engagement of adaptive emotion regulation tend to reach 
less reasoned judgments in scenarios involving intense negative 
emotion. Indeed, a 2017 study shows that deficient emotion regulation 
caused a shift towards emotion-based responses on moral probes.298 In 
 
 292 Id. at 7-8. 
 293 See Matthew Feinberg, Robb Willer, Olga Antonenko & Oliver P. John, Liberating 
Reason from the Passions: Overriding Intuitionist Moral Judgments Through Emotional 
Reappraisal, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 788, 790-93 (2012); Zhongquan Li, Shiyu Xia, Xiaoyuan 
Wu & Zhaoyu Chen, Analytical Thinking Style Leads to More Utilitarian Moral 
Judgments: An Exploration with a Process-Dissociation Approach, 131 PERSONALITY & 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 180, 183 (2018); Raluca D. Szekely & Andrei C. Miu, Incidental 
Emotions in Moral Dilemmas: The Influence of Emotion Regulation, 29 COGNITION & 
EMOTION 64, 71 (2015). 
 294 See Li et al., supra note 293, at 180 (“In the dual process model of moral 
judgment, utilitarian judgment is associated with the reasoning process, and 
deontological judgment with the intuitive process.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 295 The process-dissociation approach presents congruent and incongruent versions 
of moral dilemmas in order to isolate whether cognitive reappraisal selectively increases 
reason-based judgments, selectively decreases emotion-based judgment, or a 
combination of both. For further discussion and examples of process-dissociation moral 
dilemma tasks, see id. at 181. 
 296 See supra note 288 (defining cognitive reappraisal). 
 297 See Li et al., supra note 293, at 183. 
 298 Zhang et al., supra note 21, at 4-5 (utilizing the process-dissociation approach 
and finding that “deontological inclination was significantly higher for the participants 
with high emotion regulation difficulties . . . [but] utilitarian inclinations did not differ 
significantly between participants with high emotion regulation difficulties . . . and 
those with low emotion regulation difficulties”). 
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sum, exposure to an emotionally evocative scenario increases the 
likelihood that an individual with psychosis will exhibit intuitive 
decision-making dominated by System 1 with little System 2 
deliberative reflection.  
2. Emotions’ Contribution to Existence of Delusions 
Emotions may contribute to the formation and maintenance of 
delusions. Persecutory delusions appear to be of particular significance 
in insanity cases,299 and research suggests these delusions are most 
consistently associated with violent outcomes in populations with 
psychosis.300 Therefore, this section will focus primarily on that 
delusion subtype. Understanding the factors that contribute to delusion 
genesis helps to explain why the presence of a delusion indicates a 
disordered thought process which bears directly on an individual’s 
capacity for moral reasoning in connection with that delusion. 
a. Emotion Regulation Dysfunctions and the Genesis and Maintenance 
of Persecutory Delusions 
First, to continue the discussion of emotion regulation, psychologists 
have suggested that difficulties in regulating emotions may contribute 
to the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions.301 Research 
suggests that negative affect precedes paranoid ideation, which in turn 
leads to presentation of psychotic symptoms, including delusions.302 
 
 299 See, e.g., George F. Parker, Outcomes of Assertive Community Treatment in an NGRI 
Conditional Release Program, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 291, 295 tbl.1 (2004) 
(examining eighty-three NGRI acquittees and finding that fifty-nine (71%) had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and fifty-four (65%) had paranoid schizophrenia 
specifically). 
 300 See, e.g., Coid et al., supra note 256, at 466-70 (finding a significant association 
between serious violence and delusions of being surveilled, persecution, and 
conspiracy). 
 301 See Stefan Westermann & Tania M. Lincoln, Emotion Regulation Difficulties are 
Relevant to Persecutory Ideation, 84 PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 273, 281-83 (2011). 
Cognitive biases may exacerbate emotion regulation impairments. See id. at 282 (“[T]he 
usually functional emotion regulation strategy of reappraising emotional evocative 
situations in a neutral or non-threatening manner could be corrupted by hasty decisions 
due to jumping-to-conclusions . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
 302 See Ingrid Kramer, Claudia J.P. Simons, T.W. Wigman, Dina Collip, Nele Jacobs, 
Catherine Derom, Evert Thiery, Jim van Os, Inez Myin-Germeys & Marieke Wichers, 
Time-Lagged Moment-to-Moment Interplay Between Negative Affect and Paranoia: New 
Insights in the Affective Pathway to Psychosis, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 278, 284 (2013) 
(using time-lagged analysis to show that negative affect preceded everyday paranoia 
which — when aggregated — caused psychotic symptoms).  
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Further, psychology researchers have suggested that paranoid ideation 
could be a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy, whereby 
persecutory delusions form as a “dysfunctional strategy that leads to a 
(short-term) relief” from distressing paranoid thoughts.303 
b. Role of Stress 
Populations with psychosis demonstrate an aberrant response to 
stress compared to healthy controls, which may contribute to the 
formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions.304 
Experimentally, populations with psychosis demonstrate a stronger 
reaction — both objectively and subjectively — to stressors compared 
to healthy controls.305 Importantly, the capacity for effective emotion 
acceptance and regulation predicts both the strength of the 
physiological response to stress as well as the change in level of 
paranoia.306 Thus, Tania Lincoln and colleagues have suggested that 
“having more pronounced [emotion regulation] skills seems to help 
everybody remain calmer in the face of stressors but also helps people 
with psychosis not to respond to stress symptomatically.”307 
Psychology and cognitive neuroscience studies document that stress 
affects moral decision-making, as is theorized by the “stress induced 
deliberation-to-intuition” (“SIDI”) model developed by Rongjun Yu.308 
The SIDI model revolves around the observation that individuals make 
more intuitive responses when under stress, and thus the model 
suggests that, under stressful conditions, “intuitive responses may 
bypass the examination of reasoning and reach the threshold to become 
 
 303 Westermann & Lincoln, supra note 301, at 282 (observing a “positive association 
between paranoid ideation and a greater acceptance of negative emotions” and 
suggesting that development of a persecutory delusion may temporarily help an 
individual to cope with distressing paranoid thoughts and regain a sense of control). 
 304 See Tania M. Lincoln, Maike Hartmann, Ulf Köther & Steffen Moritz, Dealing 
with Feeling: Specific Emotion Regulation Skills Predict Responses to Stress in Psychosis, 
228 PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 216, 219-21 (2015). 
 305 Id. (using noise stressors to show that individuals with psychotic illnesses — 
specifically schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder — demonstrated more reactivity 
to stress both through self-report (i.e., subjective) and physiological (i.e., objective) 
measures).  
 306 Id. at 219-20. 
 307 Id.; see also Inez Myin-Germeys & Jim van Os, Stress-Reactivity in Psychosis: 
Evidence for an Affective Pathway to Psychosis, 27 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 409, 416 
(2007) (suggesting that while difficulties in dealing with stress are present across many 
psychiatric illnesses, the negative effects of stress are particularly pronounced in 
individuals with psychosis).  
 308 See Rongjun Yu, Stress Potentiates Decision Biases: A Stress Induced Deliberation-
to-Intuition (SIDI) Model, 3 NEUROBIOLOGY STRESS 83, 84 (2016). 
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final decisions.”309 Notably, the SIDI model is a dual-process account 
utilizing the distinction between System 1 intuitive processes and 
System 2 cognitive processes.310 The SIDI model is supported by studies 
showing that cognitive control is adversely affected under stressful 
conditions, which leads to weakened emotion regulation, causing a 
drive towards emotionally habitual responses.311 In sum, aberrant 
responses to stressors in populations with psychosis provide strong 
support of overreliance on System 1 and failed engagement of System 2, 
suggesting that an individual with psychosis may have an impaired 
capacity for rational self-reflection within the context of a delusion.  
D. Summary: Moral Decision-Making in Psychosis 
The weight of the evidence discussed above suggests that individuals 
with psychotic disorders may have a significantly impaired capacity for 
moral decision-making in the context of a delusion. Cognitive biases 
associated with delusions implicate an overreliance on System 1 
intuitive/emotional processes (e.g., JTC, liberal acceptance, hostile 
attribution) coupled with impaired engagement of System 2 
reflective/cognitive override processes (e.g., BADE).312 Stress exhibited 
by populations with persecutory delusions also suggests a shift towards 
overuse of System 1 processes.313 Further, the association of delusions 
with significant impairment in emotion regulation intimates that 
individuals with delusions may be less able to mitigate intuitively 
generated emotions to arrive at reasoned decisions than those without 
delusions.314 In sum, the evidence suggests that — especially within the 
context of a delusion and under stress — psychotic individuals are 
prone to act intuitively with a diminished capacity for meaningful 
 
 309 Id. (“[S]tressed individuals may fall back more on intuition and involve less 
amounts of conscious reasoning.”); see Farid F. Youssef, Karine Dookeeram, Vasant 
Basdeo, Emmanuel Francis, Mekaeel Doman, Danielle Mamed, Stefan Maloo, Joel 
Degannes, Linda Dobo, Phatsimo Ditshotlo & George Legall, Stress Alters Personal 
Moral Decision Making, 37 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 491, 494-95 (2012) 
(demonstrating a moderate negative correlation between stress and utilitarian decisions 
during moral dilemma tasks and noting that the results are in line with Greene’s dual-
process model). 
 310 See Yu, supra note 308, at 92 (noting that the SIDI model closely resembles a 
“default-interventionalist” model, which is where the “intuition system supplies rapid 
default responses (intuition proposes) and [the] deliberation system may approve or 
intervene upon (deliberation decides)”). 
 311 Id. at 88-89. 
 312 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 313 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 314 See supra Part III.C.1. 
  
1836 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1777 
cognitive reflection. A judge should permit the trier of fact to consider 
this evidence, along with other evidence of mental disorder, when 
evaluating a defendant’s capacity to distinguish the wrongfulness of her 
act.315  
The next Part evaluates various legal reforms motivated by this 
science and the lessons learned from jurisdictions’ experience with the 
insane delusion rule. Part V considers broader implications for the 
insanity defense. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL REFORM 
The weight of the scientific evidence suggests that delusions signal 
the presence of significant cognitive and emotional impairments that 
may impact decision-making related to those delusions.316 If that 
understanding is correct, then a rule premised upon the exercise of 
rational, moral reasoning by deluded individuals about their delusions 
is fundamentally flawed. Certainly, no jurisdiction should deprive an 
individual of an insanity defense because the perceived facts of her 
delusion fail to meet the four corners of a recognized justification or 
excuse.317 Therefore, Nevada should reform its insanity statute318 — 
both by eliminating the negative aspect of the insane delusion rule and 
by expanding its list of cognizable mental conditions beyond the mere 
symptom of delusion.319 
 
 315 See supra note 229. 
 316 See supra Part III.  
 317 Historically, legal scholars have been nearly unified in denouncing the negative 
use of the insane delusion rule. See, e.g., 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL 
LAW § 393 (John M. Zane & Carl Zollmann eds., 9th ed. 1923); LAFAVE, supra note 8; 
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, at 966-68; WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 111-12; Keedy, 
supra note 229, at 87-88. 
 318 NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(6) (2020); see also Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 85 (Nev. 
2001). 
 319 Individuals with psychosis often will have significant cognitive dysfunctions in 
addition to delusions that impede decision-making. For example, a 2000 literature 
review concluded that up to 75% of patients with schizophrenia suffer “significant 
cognitive impairment,” including impaired function in “memory, attention, motor 
skills, executive function [including such cognitive abilities as attentional control, 
cognitive inhibition, inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility], and 
intelligence.” Ronan O’Carroll, Cognitive Impairment in Schizophrenia, 6 ADVANCES 
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 161, 162 (2000); see also SCHOPP, supra note 64, at 185-87 
(describing the effects of psychopathology on practical reasoning abilities). Equally as 
important, conditions besides psychosis — such as organic brain disorder, congenital 
intellectual deficiency, senility, paranoia, and neurosis — can satisfy the functional 
requirements of the right-and-wrong prong of the insanity standard. See LAFAVE, supra 
note 8, § 7.2(b)(1). 
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A more difficult question is whether, on this basis, jurisdictions 
should also jettison the affirmative aspect of the insane delusion rule. 
This Part considers this issue and offers proposals for reform and further 
conversation. It starts by evaluating the benefits that may attend the rule 
and whether those benefits may justify its retention.  
A. Potential Benefits of the Insane Delusion Rule 
For reasons already discussed,320 some scholars have argued that the 
insane delusion rule should be discarded in its entirety.321 However, 
compelling reasons support retaining its affirmative aspect and allowing 
satisfaction of the rule to establish insanity. First and perhaps most 
fundamentally, the insane delusion rule helps a trier of fact realize that 
no person who meets the criteria of the rule could have appreciated the 
wrongfulness of her act.322 Even though an insane delusion should result 
in a finding of irresponsibility, a trier of fact might not acquit on that 
basis because of complicated, conflicting, and ambiguous testimony 
regarding the defendant’s capacity to evaluate and reach moral 
decisions. As Christopher Slobogin has observed when advocating for a 
similar test of exculpation,323 application of the rule could remove the 
need to answer the “intractable question of whether those who did not 
control, think, or feel at the time of the crime had the capacity to do 
otherwise and just did not exercise it, or instead lacked the capacity to 
do so.”324  
Relatedly, the rule could function as an effective counter to juries’ 
tendency to overvalue ambiguous behavioral evidence. Juries may 
 
 320 See supra notes 46 (pointing out the problem with requiring that the defendant 
exercise sane reasoning), 52–54 (debating the relationship of the insane delusion test 
to other rules of M’Naghten), 75–77 and accompanying text (noting the bad science 
upon which the insane delusion rule is based). 
 321 See, e.g., GLUECK, supra note 46; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 43, at 215-19; RAY, 
supra note 46; STEPHEN, supra note 66, at 161, 168, 174-75; WILLIAMS, supra note 8, 
§ 161. 
 322 See infra note 338 and accompanying text. 
 323 See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist Test as a Replacement for 
the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 523, 541 n.123 (2009) [hereinafter 
Integrationist Test] (noting that M’Naghten’s insane delusion test is “very similar” to the 
Integrationist Test he proposes); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the 
Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1238-39 (2000) 
[hereinafter An End to Insanity] (proposing, in lieu of an affirmative insanity defense, 
that “[m]ental disorder should have exculpatory effect when, and only when, its effects 
lead to a lack of the required mens rea or to reasons for committing the crime that sound 
in justification or duress”). 
 324 Slobogin, Integrationist Test, supra note 323, at 540-41. 
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disregard strong — even uncontested — medical opinion of insanity on 
the basis of lay testimony regarding behavioral evidence such as normal 
demeanor, flight, denial, expression of remorse, or planning.325 This 
evidence is within jurors’ body of experience and common 
understanding. However, such evidence is often ambiguous, 
misleading, and of limited probative value. For instance, flight may be 
consistent with a defendant’s persecutory delusions. Flight could also 
reflect the rational judgment that it is best to avoid unnecessary 
interactions with law enforcement, who disproportionately commit acts 
of violence against individuals experiencing psychosis or other acute 
symptoms of mental illness.326 Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts recently recognized that “flight is not necessarily 
probative of a suspect’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt” when 
the class to which the defendant belongs regularly suffers “the recurring 
indignity” of hostile interactions with law enforcement.327 Similarly, a 
person with mental illness may deny her involvement in an event due 
to the reasonable fear that law enforcement would not believe her 
account.328 Lay testimony of normal demeanor is of particularly 
questionable probative value when the defendant has a documented 
 
 325 See, e.g., Moler v. State, 782 N.E.2d 454, 457-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); State v. 
Claibon, 395 So. 2d 770, 772-74 (La. 1981). The U.S. Supreme Court has found this 
practice constitutional. Moore v. Duckworth, 443 U.S. 713, 714 (1979). 
 326 See Michael T. Rossler & William Terrill, Mental Illness, Police Use of Force, and 
Citizen Injury, 20 POLICE Q. 189, 199, 204 (2017) (finding that persons with mental 
illness were “significantly more likely to experience higher levels of police force” than 
persons without mental illness in an analysis of 4,000 police use-of-force incidents); 
Amam Z. Saleh, Paul S. Appelbaum, Xiaoyu Liu, T. Scott Stroup & Melanie Wall, Deaths 
of People with Mental Illness During Interactions with Law Enforcement, 58 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 110, 114 (2018) (finding, in a study of 1,099 civilians killed in the United 
States during interactions with police in 2015, that those with signs of mental illness 
were seven times more likely than others to be killed). But see Richard R. Johnson, 
Suspect Mental Disorder and Police Use of Force, 38 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 127, 134, 140-
41 (2011) (noting that his study of 619 police-suspect encounters found, after 
controlling for factors such as a suspect’s physical resistance and possession of a 
weapon, that police did not treat those with mental illness more harshly). 
 327 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016). 
 328 See Amy C. Watson, Patrick W. Corrigan & Victor Ottati, Police Responses to 
Persons with Mental Illness: Does the Label Matter?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 378, 
379 (2004) (“People with mental illness are often viewed as untrustworthy and lacking 
integrity. Conversely, they may be viewed as incompetent and unable to provide reliable 
information, as suggested in police training texts.”); cf. S.A. Koskela, B. Pettitt & V.M. 
Drennan, The Experiences of People with Mental Health Problems Who Are Victims of 
Crime with the Police in England: A Qualitative Study, 56 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 
1019-20 (2016) (explaining that many people with mental illness who participated in a 
study hesitated to report crime because they had not been believed in the past or because 
they feared being blamed for the crime). 
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history of a psychotic disorder.329 The Court of Appeals of Indiana has 
declared: 
The proposition that a jury may infer that a person’s actions 
before and after a crime are “indicative of his actual mental 
health at the time of the” crime is logical when dealing with a 
defendant who is not prone to delusional or hallucinogenic 
episodes. However, when a defendant has a serious and well-
documented mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, one that 
causes him to see, hear, and believe realities that do not exist, 
such logic collapses.330  
Deep and widespread sanism,331 skepticism toward the insanity defense, 
ignorance of the consequences of acquittal on grounds of insanity, and 
the dynamics of the defense (whereby the defendant often admits doing 
heinous and violent acts) combine to propel juries to use such 
ambiguous evidence to convict, despite strong mental health evidence 
of lack of capacity.332 
Second, the insane delusion rule correctly recognizes that people with 
serious mental illness, even psychotic disorders, exhibit rational 
decision-making much of the time.333 One modern strain of research 
has concluded that patients with schizophrenia retain the capacity for 
 
 329 See Moler, 782 N.E.2d at 458 (“While the jury is the ultimate finder of fact, we 
fail to see how evidence of a defendant’s demeanor before and after a crime can have 
much probative value when a schizophrenic defendant is involved.”). 
 330 Id. at 459. 
 331 Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992) (defining sanism 
as “an irrational prejudice . . . of the same quality and character of other prevailing 
prejudices such as racism, sexism, heterosexism and ethnic bigotry that have been 
reflected both in our legal system and in the ways that lawyers represent clients”). 
 332 See, e.g., Bass v. State, 585 So. 2d 225, 235 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), overruled by 
Trawick v. State, 698 So. 2d 151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (affirming conviction where 
defendant’s “statements acknowledging responsibility for the shootings and his request 
for an attorney” suggested sanity, despite “substantial evidence that the appellant was 
psychotic at the time”); Sistrunk v. State, 455 So. 2d 287, 289-90 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) 
(affirming conviction where defendant “displayed a consciousness of guilt when he fled 
from the house after stabbing his niece” and took the stand in his own defense — thus 
supplying “his demeanor and manner of testifying” as evidence for the jury to consider 
— despite the unanimous testimony of four expert witnesses that the defendant showed 
signs of paranoid schizophrenia after the murder); cases cited supra note 325. 
 333 See LISA BORTOLOTTI, IRRATIONALITY 61 (2015); J.H. BALFOUR BROWNE, THE 
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY § 16 (2d ed. 1875); Sidney Gendin, Insanity and 
Criminal Responsibility, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 99, 100, 104 (1973); Stephen J. Morse, Crazy 
Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 
567, 573, 576 (1978); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense 
Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 790 (1985). 
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moral decision-making, at least in regard to decisions independent of 
delusions or other characteristic positive symptoms.334 The rule 
recognizes this capacity and accounts for a defendant’s motivation. 
Offenders with mental illnesses, like nondisordered offenders, commit 
crimes for various reasons.335 While a small fraction of the crimes of 
offenders with mental illnesses are the direct result of their 
symptomology, research suggests that the vast majority of crimes are 
either indirectly related to their illnesses or unrelated.336 Thus, the 
crimes of those with mental disorder — like the crimes of those without 
— may reflect anger, frustration, lust, jealousy, greed, or revenge.337 
They may also reflect justified fear. When a person, with or without 
mental illness, perceived reality in a way that renders her acts blameless 
“as defined by the moral compass we all share,” she should be 
excused.338  
By recognizing the rational decision-making of the defendant, the 
affirmative aspect of the rule sends a powerful expressive message. It 
conveys: we understand what you did because — had we been in your 
shoes, with your mental health condition — we would have done the 
same thing. This message emphasizes the similarity of those with 
mental illness to those without, thereby enhancing the dignity of 
criminal defendants. In essence, the rule (at least partially) transforms 
the excuse of insanity into an excusing condition that, under modern 
trends to subjectivize defenses, increasingly applies to those without 
mental illness: a mistaken belief that conditions amounted to a legal 
justification or excuse.339 In affirming that the same standards for 
conduct apply to those with serious mental illness as for those without, 
this standard also may enhance society’s respect for — and feelings of 
kinship with — individuals with mental illness.  
 
 334 See supra note 225 (discussing this research). 
 335 E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 558-
59 (2012) [hereinafter Theorizing Mental Health Courts]. 
 336 E. Lea Johnston, Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform for Offenders with 
Serious Mental Illness, 71 FLA. L. REV. 515, 533-35 (2019). Instead, the crimes of 
offenders with mental disorder are driven by the same criminogenic factors that drive 
offenders without mental illness, including antisocial attitudes, thoughts, or personality 
features; substance abuse; poor employment prospects; and family problems. Id. at 536. 
 337 Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, supra note 335, at 558-59; Slobogin, 
Integrationist Test, supra note 323, at 538.  
 338 Slobogin, Integrationist Test, supra note 323, at 534; see also GLEASON L. ARCHER, 
CRIMINAL LAW 58 (1923) (“The law recognizes the right to take life in self defense in the 
case of a sane man. It is very proper therefore that the insane man’s delusion, as real to 
him as facts to a sane person, should exempt him from liability.”). 
 339 Slobogin, An End to Insanity, supra note 323, at 1202. 
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Thus, it is not inherently irrational or unjust to excuse a defendant 
when the delusion that motivated her act would satisfy a legal defense, 
and doing so may enhance the dignity of the defendant and clarify 
complicated issues for the jury. However, different procedural 
manifestations of the rule realize these goals to a varying degree, and 
some carry negative consequences for the general insanity evaluation.340 
B. Disadvantages of the Affirmative Aspect of the Rule 
Modern commentators have found the affirmative aspect of the insane 
delusion rule “not objectionable,”341 but its operation can undermine a 
defendant’s general insanity defense. In jurisdictions without the insane 
delusion rule, mental health experts and triers of fact tend to evaluate 
insanity with few evidentiary restrictions.342 Analysis of cases in these 
jurisdictions shows that evaluations tend to be far-ranging, context-
dependent, and multi-variable. Typically, the trier of fact will consider 
the defendant’s diagnosis, the longevity of the disorder, severity of 
symptoms, history of hospitalizations, bizarre behavior and 
communications, and medication compliance.343 Delusions factor into 
 
 340 See infra Part IV.B. 
 341 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, at 967 (arguing “the delusion rule when properly 
understood and applied can never work to the disadvantage of the defendant”); 
WEIHOFEN, supra note 6, at 111 (“If the mistake of fact test is merely an additional test, 
or merely one specific application of the right and wrong test, it is not objectionable.”). 
 342 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 53-58; Hall, supra note 66, at 774 (“Although 
the M’Naghten Rules are phrased in terms of cognition, they are generally interpreted 
broadly by the courts, with the result that all psychiatric evidence relevant to the 
defendant’s mental condition is admitted.”). 
 343 See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 671 So. 2d 307, 312-13 (La. 1996) (reversing the 
conviction of second degree murder and finding the defendant not guilty by reason of 
insanity due to a “twenty-five year history of mental illness with delusions, auditory 
hallucinations, religious obsessions and occasional psychotic episodes, particularly 
when defendant was subjected to stress or failed to take his medication; the testimony 
of three psychiatrists and one psychologist who opined that defendant could not 
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the killing; evidence of defendant’s dispute 
with his bank causing him stress, a precursor of psychotic episodes, and of his 
involuntary commitment to a mental institution shortly before the killing and his 
violent behavior there; and extensive evidence of bizarre behavior, before and after the 
killing, which was consistent with conduct that has led to his numerous 
hospitalizations,” as well as his committing the crime in front of law enforcement); State 
v. Currie, 812 So. 2d 128, 138-39 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (vacating the original convictions 
and finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity on the basis of age at time of 
crime, family history, organic brain damage at birth, childhood head injuries, history of 
institutionalization, age of diagnosis of schizophrenia, history of medication 
compliance, “delusions, hallucinations and ideas of persecution for some time 
preceding the crime,” the way the crime was committed, and post-crime behavior). 
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the capacity assessment — including, broadly, whether the defendant, 
at the time of the act in question, subjectively felt justified (not, had the 
circumstances been as she supposed, whether she objectively would 
have been justified) — a much rougher, less exacting, gestalt inquiry.344 
The delusions may also signal a disordered thinking process.345 This 
broad inclusion of evidence likely leads to a more holistic assessment of 
the defendant’s culpability that reflects the extent to which a trier of fact 
feels sympathy for the defendant and feels that she deviates so markedly 
from healthy individuals that holding her responsible would be unjust 
or ineffective.346  
On the other hand, the insane delusion rule trains expert witnesses’ 
focus on the content of a defendant’s delusions. This elevates delusions 
above other symptoms of mental disorder and results in an artificial 
division of mental health evidence. In addition, if a delusion does not 
satisfy the insane delusion test, mental health experts may minimize or 
even disregard delusions as probative evidence of general insanity.347 
Thus, even in jurisdictions that permit a defendant who fails the insane 
delusion test to appeal to the general right-and-wrong test, the insane 
delusion rule may reduce the defendant’s likelihood of ultimately 
 
 344 See supra note 180 (detailing exemplar cases). 
 345 See, e.g., State v. Dye, No. 08-0887, 2009 WL 3337617, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 
7, 2009) (discussing the opinion of a defense expert witness who opined that the 
defendant’s alleged delusion “that God wanted him to undo the harm caused by Elvis’s 
pedophilia by joining a crusade to kill pedophiles” showed he “had an impaired ability 
to make decisions”); State v. Gerone, 435 So. 2d 1132, 1134, 1137 (La. Ct. App. 1983) 
(finding the verdict of sanity contrary to a preponderance of the evidence and citing 
expert testimony that “his thinking was clouded” by “hallucinated voices telling him to 
commit the crime, to be relieved of suffering and to be transported to another plane” 
and feeling “he was under the direct control and influence of two men on the west 
coast”).  
 346 See State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 789 (Minn. 1972) (interpreting the 
M’Naghten standard to allow consideration of cognitive, emotional, and volitional 
evidence and stressing “this approach does, indeed, take account of the entire man and 
his mind as a whole . . . it enables the jury to consider all the relevant symptomatology 
. . . which enable it adequately to perform its historical function in the criminal case” 
(quoting Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 
651 (1968))); Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary 
Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 36-39 (1990) (discussing the 
role of “ordinary common sense” in jury insanity verdicts). Studies finding no 
significant differences in acquittal rates among insanity instructions support the notion 
that that verdicts tend to align with the “gut” or “common sense, intuitive 
understanding of insanity” of the trier of fact. Id. at 37; see Norman J. Finkel, The 
Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Verdict Schemas, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 534-35 
(1991) (reviewing empirical studies finding no significant differences in mock jurors’ 
verdicts when applying different insanity tests). 
 347 See Klinck, supra note 40, at 465.  
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prevailing. In this situation, unless the defendant adduces substantial 
evidence of co-existing cognitive dysfunction beyond the delusions, she 
will have little chance of succeeding in her insanity claim — even if the 
delusional context evidences such deep disorder that understanding 
and appreciating wrongfulness was unlikely at the time of the act.  
Some evidence supports this hypothesis. In 2013, Brandon A. Yakush 
(a forensic psychologist) and Melinda Wolbransky (a professor of 
psychology) published an article intended to guide forensic mental 
health professionals in assessing defendants’ appreciation of 
wrongfulness in insanity cases.348 They suggest that forensic mental 
health examiners, when assessing “whether or not the defendant’s 
mental disorder or defect impaired his capacity to reason through the 
illegality of the act,”349 largely ignore the potential contribution of 
delusions.350 Yakush and Wolbransky justify this position with their 
belief that delusions do not implicate cognitive dysfunctions sufficiently 
corrosive of appreciation to warrant consideration in the general right-
or-wrong test. They explain that, when a person’s act was inspired by a 
delusion, “the processing of right and wrong was likely contaminated 
by delusional content,” but, “from a clinical perspective, the defendant 
likely knew the act was illegal in so far as much as he was capable of 
processing right- and wrong-level cognitions.”351 Thus, the typical 
delusional defendant will be found sane.352 They assert the insane 
 
 348 Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 185, at 355. 
 349 Id. at 360. The authors stated, “While this article focuses primarily on the issue 
of defining wrongfulness in California, the discussion is relevant for those other states 
and the federal courts that have adopted similar definitions of insanity.” Id. at 357. 
 350 See id. at 366 (“Thus, the clinical component of insanity evaluations in California 
should focus primarily on the role of cognitive dysfunctions that could have impaired 
the defendant’s ability to process right versus wrong decisions. Any other symptoms 
would be important only to the final decision if they somehow impaired the defendant’s 
reasoning abilities (e.g., the auditory hallucinations were so constant and overwhelming 
that the individual was unable to think clearly).”). 
 351 Id. at 360. 
 352 See id. at 366 (“In essence, delusions or hallucinations in the absence of cognitive 
impairments would not ordinarily lead to the type of dysfunction necessary for the 
defendant to have not known his act was wrong, whether illegal or immoral.”); id. at 
360 (“[I]f the belief that drives the illicit behavior is sourced in mental illness (e.g., 
delusional ideation) . . . from a clinical perspective, the defendant likely knew the act 
was illegal in so far as much as he was capable of processing right- and wrong-level 
cognitions. Due to an absence of mental disorganization, the reasoning skills necessary 
to reason right and wrong were typically present. Yet, the processing of right and wrong 
was likely contaminated by delusional content. Thus, the defendant was able to think 
about right and wrong decisions but came to the wrong conclusion due to false 
beliefs.”). This statement is true so long as a defendant maintained the capacity to know 
that society would view the act as wrong. See id. at 366. 
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delusion rule provides a limited exception: the rule allows delusions 
that involve perceived justification, such as acting in self-defense 
because of imminent danger, to qualify for insanity without additional 
signs of cognitive dysfunction.353 This tendency to limit the import of 
delusions to their content may exist in any jurisdiction that recognizes 
the insane delusion rule.354  
C. Sound Versions of the Insane Delusion Rule 
To avoid the tendency to telescope the issue of insanity355 — either 
by confining the inquiry to the content of the delusion (and the 
satisfaction of the insane delusion rule) or by excising delusions from 
the general insanity evaluation — jurisdictions should restrict the 
insane delusion rule to its most affirmative aspect, i.e., prohibit its 
introduction unless the defense is supported by sufficient evidence. 
This version of the insane delusion rule is currently in operation in 
Texas and Georgia.356 To assist the jury, the court should submit a jury 
instruction for the relevant perceived justification or excuse when it 
provides an insane delusion instruction.357 Also, defense attorneys 
should make use of all evidence of cognitive and emotional impairments 
associated with delusions to make clear that delusional individuals are 
more likely to perceive an imminent threat than would non-delusional 
people on the same facts. It should be reversible error to offer an insane 
delusion instruction if the perceived, delusional facts would not 
constitute a defense because doing so could serve no useful purpose.358 
Thus, California — which permits the prosecution to raise the insane 
delusion rule over the objection of the defendant359 — should reform 
 
 353 See id. at 366-67; see also Richard Rogers, An Introduction to Insanity Evaluations, in 
LEARNING FORENSIC ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 97, 109 (Rebecca Jackson & 
Ronald Roesch eds., 2d ed. 2016) (“The crux of the determination can be stated simply: If 
the defendant’s beliefs and perceptions were accurate, would they justify his or her 
actions?”). In addition, individuals experiencing delusions that are “so bizarre that [they] 
fall[] outside of society’s moral framework,” such as the belief that the victim is a menacing 
alien, may qualify for insanity. Yakush & Wolbransky, supra note 185, at 367. 
 354 See supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 355 Cf. Klinck, supra note 40, at 465 (highlighting the danger, inherent in the insane 
delusion rule, of saying “that where there is a specific delusion, one should not look 
beyond it to see whether there is more general insanity”). 
 356 See supra Parts II.B.1.a, II.B.1.c.  
 357 See supra Part II.B.1.a (describing Texas’s approach). 
 358 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, at 967-68. 
 359 See, e.g., People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 913-14 (Ct. App. 2015), as 
modified on denial of reh’g (“Over defense counsel’s objections, the trial court read a 
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its rule. In all cases, a defendant who asserts an insanity defense under 
an insane delusion theory should also be able to assert (and use her 
delusions to support) insanity under the general test.360  
A second fairly unobjectionable use of the insane delusion rule — 
best exemplified in military and federal courts — is to inform the 
definition of “wrongfulness.”361 The rule is certainly illustratively 
helpful in those states that opt to limit the term “wrong” to “illegal.” 
Indeed, it is difficult to fathom a defensible way of understanding 
“illegal” in a perceived justification case without resort to the specific 
elements of the justification. However, this use of the insane delusion 
rule should only be used by the court to justify its selection of particular 
instructions on “wrongfulness” for the jury, and perhaps in its decision 
whether to allow the defense to argue that the perceived facts of the 
defendant’s delusion led her mistakenly to believe her act was justified 
or excused (i.e., legal and thus not “wrong”).  
Courts must be mindful of preserving the defendant’s ability to use a 
delusion and its associated impairments to advance a general insanity 
defense.362 When the facts as the defendant perceived them approach a 
cognizable defense, evidence pertaining to cognitive biases — 
particularly those implicating an overreliance on System 1 intuitive 
processes and impaired engagement of System 2 cognitive override 
processes — as well as evidence of impaired ability to engage in effective 
emotion regulation, may be probative for demonstrating an inability to 
understand wrongfulness.363 Relatedly, in all M’Naghten jurisdictions, 
judges and defense counsel should encourage forensic mental health 
professionals to develop a broad understanding of the possible 
relevance of delusions to general insanity.364 
 
modified version of CALCRIM No. 505 instructing jurors that they must accept it as ‘a 
standard jury instruction for the law of self defense.’”). 
 360 See infra notes 362–64 and accompanying text. Rollin Perkins and Ronald Boyce 
argued these procedural restraints would ensure the insane delusion rule “never 
work[s] to the disadvantage of the defendant” and proposed jury instructions to achieve 
this objective. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 41, 967-68. 
 361 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 362 See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
 363 See supra Part III; infra text accompanying note 394. For exemplar cases, see supra 
note 180.  
 364 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 104-05 (urging lawyers to solicit testimony “on 
the nature of perception, understanding, [and] appreciation of consequence”). 
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CONCLUSION AND FURTHER LESSONS FOR INSANITY 
Nine jurisdictions — accounting for roughly half the prison 
population in the United States — currently employ some version of the 
insane delusion rule, and recent case law indicates a strengthening of 
the rule.365 While the rule carries some benefits, failing to satisfy its 
contours may impair a defendant’s appeal to the general right-and-
wrong test. A growing body of evidence in the cognitive sciences 
suggests that a strong set of cognitive and emotional distortions may 
contribute to the formation and maintenance of delusions and that these 
distortions may impair moral reasoning connected to those delusions.366 
The insane delusion rule should not operate in a way that would 
diminish the consideration of these impairments in the general insanity 
test. Thus, this Article argues that Nevada and California should reform 
or discard their versions of the insane delusion rule. Perhaps more 
importantly, courts, defense attorneys, and forensic mental health 
practitioners must develop a broader understanding of the possible 
relevance of delusions and their associated impairments for the insane 
delusion rule and the general wrongfulness test. 
The science of delusions holds broader implications as well. First, it 
demonstrates that emotion is key to rationality and that impairments in 
emotion regulation can warp the reasoning process.367 The primary 
thrust of the general test in M’Naghten is that a “disease of the mind” 
can produce a “defect of reason” such that a person should be held 
 
 365 See supra Part II. 
 366 See supra Part III. 
 367 See supra Part III.C. Other scholars have also examined the importance of 
emotion for reasoning. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Rationality, Insanity, and the 
Insanity Defense: Reflections on the Limits of Reason, 39 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 161, 167-
68, 187-93 (2015) (“Knowing must run through the emotions, the passions, or else the 
motivation to do lacks psychological valence. The traditional view of insanity as an 
excusing condition [as reflecting a singular rational faculty that exists apart from affect] 
is thus incomplete and sometimes even incoherent.”); Federica Coppola, Motus Animi 
in Mente Insana: An Emotion-Oriented Paradigm of Legal Insanity Informed by the 
Neuroscience of Moral Judgments and Decision-Making, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 
5-7, 30-49 (2019) (stressing “the critical role that emotions and emotional processes 
play either in informing or in hindering moral decision-making” and pointing to 
findings that “cognitive faculties alone cannot give rise to moral decisions without 
emotional influence”); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational 
Understanding,” and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1399-409 
(2006) (considering the differing effects that emotion has on elements of the decision-
making model); Laura Reider, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating 
the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, 313-
29, 341 (1998) (reasoning that “empirical sciences reveal that emotional capacities are 
inextricably intertwined with cognitive and intellectual capacities”). 
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blameless for her acts.368 This emphasis on mental disorder’s effect on 
reasoning indicates that all symptoms of mental disease that could 
impair moral reasoning should be considered in the right-and-wrong 
insanity inquiry.369 Thus, the conceptions of reasoning and rationality 
inherent in the M’Naghten standard should extend to emotional 
capacities,370 as some courts have concluded.371 To this end, defense 
attorneys should probe the relationship between delusions, emotional 
dysfunction, and reasoning in their examinations of forensic experts 
and include it in closing arguments. Defense lawyers should also 
accelerate the law’s formal incorporation and recognition of emotion in 
the M’Naghten right-and-wrong test by requesting instructions for 
“know” or “appreciate” that include both cognitive and affective 
components and encouraging the development of case law on the 
subject.  
Second, the science of delusions demonstrates that heightened 
emotion — such as panic or rage — may result in a loss of control (at 
least partially) through the mechanism of a truncated reasoning 
process.372 Thus, impairments in cognition cannot easily be separated 
 
 368 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 369 STEPHEN, supra note 66, at 163-64 (arguing that a person “unequal to the effort of 
calm sustained thought upon subjects connected with his delusions” cannot be said “to 
know or have a capacity of knowing that the act which he proposed to do is wrong”); 
Duff, supra note 64, at 446-47, 450 (“For to understand something as a possible reason 
for action (even as a reason by which others claim I should be moved) is to grasp it as 
something about which I could care, and by which I could be moved to act; such a grasp 
must draw on my capacities for rational emotion.”); see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 57, at 62.  
 370 See supra note 369. Others have argued that reaching this result would require 
modification of the M’Naghten test. See Coppola, supra note 367, at 52-53 (proposing a 
tripartite insanity test with an emotional prong that “would assess agents’ capacity to 
emotionally appreciate the moral significance of their actions” (emphasis omitted)); 
Reider, supra note 367, at 333 (suggesting the insanity standard “should consist of a 
tripartite test” that assesses: (1) “the defendant’s ability to know right from wrong”; (2) 
“the defendant’s capacity for emotions, feelings, and particular body regulatory 
systems”; and (3) the defendant’s “ability to control actions”). 
 371 See, e.g., State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 790 (Minn. 1972) (affirming that 
“the test [for knowing right from wrong] should be the accused’s ability to emotionally 
and intellectually realize and appreciate, as an integrated personality, the nature and 
consequences of the moral choice presented” (citing W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Modern 
Status of the M’Naghten “Right-and-Wrong” Test for Criminal Responsibility, 45 A.L.R.2d 
1447 (1956))). 
 372 See Coppola, supra note 367, at 48 (arguing that neuroscientific findings suggest 
(1) self-control consists of interrelated cognitive, affective, and motivational processes; 
and (2) “[a] disruption in either cognitive or emotional processes . . . can equally 
endanger a given choice of appropriate behavior in response to certain stimulus”); supra 
Part III. 
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from volition.373 In 1883, James Fitzjames Stephen explained the close 
relationship between “knowledge of wrongfulness” and self-control in 
this way: 
[T]he power of self-control must mean a power to attend to 
distant motives and general principles of conduct, and to 
connect them rationally with the particular act under 
consideration, and a disease of the brain which so weakens the 
sufferer’s powers as to prevent him from attending or referring 
to such considerations, or from connecting the general theory 
with the particular fact, deprives him of the power of self-
control.374 
For this reason, Stephen argued that volition is inherently part of the 
right-and-wrong test.375 While not all agree,376 other legal and medical 
scholars have offered this observation as well.377 More recently, Stephen 
Morse has argued in an influential series of articles that “[v]irtually all 
cases of so-called control problems that plausibly raise a substantial 
question about the agent’s responsibility will prove on close analysis to 
be instances of irrationality, especially if the law continues to require 
that an abnormality is present.”378 The science of delusions — and the 
 
 373 See GLUECK, supra note 46, at 250-51 (observing that “the fundamental, and 
probably the most important, mode of mental life of all, as we have so often said, is the 
conative-affective mode, of which the intelligence, consciousness, knowing, etc., are but 
the instruments of expression”). 
 374 STEPHEN, supra note 66, at 170. 
 375 See id. at 170-71. 
 376 Some scholars argue the M’Naghten standard must be modified to excuse 
nonvolitional conduct. See, e.g., Steven Penney, Impulse Control and Criminal 
Responsibility: Lessons from Neuroscience, 35 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 99-100 (2012) 
(arguing, in a 2012 review of neuroscientific literature, that the insanity standard should 
be extended beyond the M’Naghten test’s focus on “moral and instrumental logic” to 
excuse mentally disordered persons who experienced a total incapacity to control their 
conduct). 
 377 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 66, at 776-81 (explaining this view as the result of 
understanding man as a “unitary being” with an “integrated personality”); cf. HORACE 
GRAHAM WYATT, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE AND WILL 156 (1930) (declaring that 
“[v]olition is the active aspect of intelligence”). 
 378 Stephen J. Morse, From Sikora to Hendricks: Mental Disorder and Criminal 
Responsibility, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 129, 162 (Lynda E. Frost & 
Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001). See generally Duff, supra note 64, at 452 (“Control over 
oneself is a matter of rational capacities: thus I have control over my actions insofar as 
I have the capacities necessary to recognize reasons and guide my actions by them, 
insofar as I a capable of engaging in practical reasoning and of actualizing its results.”); 
Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 229, at 544 (“Self-control problems of volitionally 
unimpaired agents are better understood as rationality defects.”); Stephen J. Morse, 
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mechanisms through which delusions are created, reinforced, and 
expressed through reasoning processes — support these theories and 
the inclusion of aspects of volition within the “ability to know” portion 
of M’Naghten’s right-and-wrong test. At least two state supreme courts 
agree.379 
Third and relatedly, the cognitive and emotional impairments that 
underlie delusions presumably exist along a spectrum and therefore 
militate for the recognition of a partial excuse (similar to provocation) 
or general mitigation of punishment for delusional individuals who are 
substantially, but not severely, impaired.380 The common law “heat of 
passion” defense provides: 
if the act of killing was committed under the influence of 
passion or in heat of blood, produced by reasonable 
provocation, that is, such as is ordinarily calculated to excite the 
passion beyond control, and before a reasonable time has 
elapsed for the passion to cool and reason to resume its habitual 
control, out of regard for the frailties of human nature, the 
crime [of murder] is mitigated and designated as voluntary 
manslaughter and a lesser penalty inflicted.381  
This defense provides a “partial allowance for emotional 
dysfunction,” recognizing “the wrongfulness of the homicide is 
mitigated when the emotionally charged reactivity restricts the actor’s 
 
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994) (arguing that “volitional 
problems are best understood as rationality defects); Stephen J. Morse, New 
Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES 
OF JUSTICE 157, 177-81 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (discussing the legal concept of 
responsibility through a neuroscientific lens); Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 
supra note 69 (arguing that “[t]he general capacity for rationality in a particular context 
is . . . the primary criterion of responsibility and its absence is the primary excusing 
condition); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1025, 1078 (2002) (“Control defects should be understood and adjudicated in terms of 
rationality defects, which are the best explanation of control problems.”). 
 379 See State v. Beckwith, 46 N.W.2d 20, 30 (Iowa 1951), abrogated on other grounds 
by State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1993) (“‘Irresistible impulse’ can be a 
factor under our decisions when, and only when, it so operates upon a diseased mind 
as to destroy the comprehension of consequences; it is not, in and of itself, a defense.”); 
State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 788-89 (Minn. 1972). 
 380 On the basis of neuroscience evidence, Federica Coppola has argued for the 
extension of “[t]he applicability of the mitigating factors in the present EED [extreme 
emotional disturbance] and heat of passion defenses . . . to cover all crimes” and has 
observed that, in tandem with an expanded insanity standard, the diminished capacity 
doctrine could function as a partial-insanity doctrine. See Coppola, supra note 367, at 
57-60.  
 381 Shorter v. Commonwealth, 67 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Ky. 1934). 
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capacity for rational thought and reasoned behavior.”382 The science of 
delusions demonstrates that, especially when under stress, a deluded 
person may have a reduced ability to engage in deliberative processing 
and may be prone to make decisions dominated by intuitively generated 
emotions.383 To the extent that her impairments prompt her “to act 
rashly, or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion 
rather than judgment,”384 she should be afforded a partial defense 
similar to the heat of passion defense. Indeed, at least one state — 
Tennessee — has recognized that an insane delusion can create such 
“passion and agitation” as to warrant this treatment.385 However, in 
contrast to the restricted use of the current heat of passion defense, no 
principled reason exists to restrict a partial defense due to mental 
disorder to cases of homicide. Framed differently — but motivated by 
similar concerns — some scholars have suggested a generic partial 
excusing condition based on diminished rationality,386 while others 
have suggested a standard discount for mental disorder at sentencing.387 
The scientific evidence presented here may support those proposals and 
provide a basis to bridge these efforts. This possibility will be explored 
in future work.388 
Finally, a strong scientific case can be made that a modified version 
of the insane delusion rule should be incorporated into — if not 
 
 382 Reid Griffith Fontaine, The Wrongfulness of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness: 
Provocation, Interpretational Bias, and Heat of Passion Homicide, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 
69, 69 (2009). Fontaine argues that the heat of passion defense should be reformulated 
to also account for cognitive dysfunction, namely “provocation interpretational bias — 
a set of cognitive difficulties by which certain ambiguous-provocation situations are 
interpreted as intentional, hostile, and wrongful by the reacting aggressor.” Id.  
 383 See supra Parts III.C.1–2. 
 384 McHargue v. Commonwealth, 21 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Ky. 1929) (citation omitted). 
 385 See Davis v. State, 28 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tenn. 1930). 
 386 See FINGARETTE & FINGARETTE HASSE, supra note 64, at 199-261; Morse, 
Diminished Rationality, supra note 64, at 289. Such a defense bears some similarity to 
the diminished rationality defense in England which allows the jury in murder cases to 
find a defendant guilty of manslaughter if the defendant proves that she was “was 
suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which . . . substantially impaired 
the defendant’s ability . . . to form a rational judgment.” Homicide Act 1957, 5 & 6 
Eliz. 2 c. 11, § 2 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/5-6/11/section/2 
[https://perma.cc/G4VQ-W2UY]. Richard Moran reports, “Although limited in scope to 
murder cases, the defense of diminished responsibility has nearly replaced the insanity 
defense under the McNaughtan rules.” MORAN, supra note 25, at 3. 
 387 See Mirko Bagaric, A Rational (Unapologetically Pragmatic) Approach to Dealing 
with the Irrational – The Sentencing of Offenders with Mental Disorders, 29 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 1, 5-6 (2016); Michael Mullan, Essay, How Should Mental Illness Be Relevant to 
Sentencing?, 88 MISS. L.J. 255, 274-75 (2019). 
 388 See Johnston & Leahey, supra note 24. 
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supplant — the wrongfulness inquiry of the M’Naghten standard.389 The 
delusion rule asks the trier of fact to see the world through the 
defendant’s eyes and then assess — had the situation been as the 
defendant supposed — whether her act would have been justified or 
excused. As currently applied, the delusion rule takes only the facts 
(disconnected from the defendant’s perceived import of or emotional 
response to those facts) of the delusion as true.390 But the science 
suggests that people with delusions may process and ultimately 
comprehend the facts inherent in delusions differently. In particular, 
they may exaggerate the nature of, and feel overwhelmed by, a perceived 
threat. Research suggests that individuals with persecutory delusions in 
moments of stress may be prone to misidentify a stimulus as threatening 
and rush to judgment without considering all information as a 
combined result of emotion regulation dysfunctions, hostile 
attributional bias, and cognitive biases.391 Defense attorneys must find 
experts to explain these phenomena.  
In addition, defense counsel should consider requesting an 
instruction that the jury, when assessing a delusional defendant’s 
ignorance of the wrongfulness of her act, should attempt to interpret 
and experience the delusional facts as the defendant would have in that 
moment — or stated more concisely, from the viewpoint of the 
defendant.392 It is only by interpreting the facts from the defendant’s 
viewpoint that the trier of fact can determine if she actually lacked 
knowledge of the wrongfulness of her response to those facts. Given the 
 
 389 See Johnston, Delusions and Moral Incapacity, supra note 24. We are grateful to 
Christopher Slobogin for drawing our attention to this aspect of the scientific 
implications. 
 390 See People v. Leeds, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 906, 914 (Ct. App. 2015), as modified on 
denial of reh’g. 
 391 See supra Part III.C. 
 392 Cf. Garvey, supra note 64, at 155 (“The delusion theory rests its verdict, sane or 
insane, on the law applied to the accused’s delusional world. It requires stepping into 
the actor’s crazy world and applying the law to the facts as they exist in that crazy 
world.”). In this way, the ignorance of wrongfulness component of the insanity test 
would resemble the “reasonableness” component of the Model Penal Code’s extreme 
emotional and mental disturbance partial defense. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1962) (“A homicide which would otherwise be murder [is manslaughter 
when it] is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such 
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s 
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”). See generally Richard 
Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I — Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the 
Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 291-304, 322 (1986) (providing thoughtful 
commentary on the history and then current use of the defense). 
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stressful and emotional nature of the factual settings of many insanity 
cases, one possible effect of such an instruction could be to hold 
delusional individuals to the gist (but not particulars) of a perceived 
justification or excuse.393 Some jurisdictions appear to follow such an 
approach, grounding an acquittal in a defendant’s perceived 
(delusional) need to use defensive force in a situation that would not, 
had it been true, meet the specifications of the self-defense 
justification.394 
 
 393 See Johnston, Delusions and Moral Incapacity, supra note 24. 
 394 See, e.g., supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (quoting the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v. Mott); supra note 180 (discussing cases 
from Louisiana, Alabama, Washington, and Indiana). Adoption of this approach may 
require a change in orientation in those jurisdictions that strictly define wrong as illegal, 
particularly in those that employ the insane delusion rule to this effect. See supra Part 
II.B.2.  
